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ABSTRACT
A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF SYSTEM 
SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY OF U.S. NAVY’S COMBAT 
SYSTEMS
Showkat Shanaz Alborzi 
Old Dominion University, 2005 
Advisor: Dr. Ji Hyon Mun
Today’s political and military reality requires the optimal use of our 
legacy systems. The objective is to maximize the effectiveness of our operations 
by efficient allocation, placement and the use of our forces and war-fighting 
systems. The synergism drawn from the capabilities of the legacy complex 
systems enables today’s war-fighting needs to be met without substantial increase 
in cost or resources. This synergism can be realized by the effective integration 
and interoperation of legacy systems into a larger, more complex system of 
systems.
However, the independently developed legacy systems in this new tactical 
environment often have different data types, languages, data modeling, operating 
systems, etc. These differences are impediments to the requirement for 
interoperability, and can create an environment of confusion, misinformation and 
certainly un-interoperability, hence hinder the safe interoperation of the meta­
system and potentially increase the risk for mishaps. Safe interoperability 
capability assures that the mission objectives are achieved not only effectively but 
also safely.
The System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) introduced in this 
dissertation provides the framework for the engineering community to evaluate, 
from system safety perspective, the interoperability issues between multiple 
complex systems in the U.S. Navy’s system of systems context. SSIF 
characterization attributes are System of Systems (SoS) tactical environment, SoS 
Engineering, SoS Safety Engineering, and Safety Critical Data. SSIF is applied to 
AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense 3.0 Program to explore and analyze the safety 
interoperability issues in the overall system, by which the SSIF is further 
validated as an effective approach in analyzing the safe interoperability capability 
in Navy’s combat systems.
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“It is immoral to design a product or system for mankind without recognition and 
evaluation o f the hazards associated with that product or system. ”
-Anonymous safety engineer
1.1 NEED FOR SYNERGY
The U.S. Navy’s war-fighting systems are increasingly more complex and 
interrelated than ever before. To make sense of the chaos created by complexity, 
communications, dependencies, etc., we need to advance our systems thinking. 
We need to find the patterns in complexities that can be understood, simplified 
and controlled.
Today’s political climate often dictates employing our forces in the most 
operationally optimized order, often referred to as “The Order of Battle”. This 
employment can be planned sometime in advance or it can be a sudden 
employment by a presidential directive. The objective remains the same— to 
maximize the effectiveness of our operations by efficient allocation, placement 
and the use of our forces, war-fighting systems and facilities.
To achieve this challenging new requirement, Department of Defense (DoD) has 
initiated a new strategy to apply synergism to existing capabilities (Alborzi, 
2004). The synergism is achieved by integrating the legacy systems into a larger, 
more complex and more capable system of systems.
The higher level of operational requirements is achieved by using the functional 
capabilities of each system to work together for even greater effect and outcome 
in operations. This initiative requires the complex systems to interoperate and 
perform joint task operations. The requirement for this interoperation and 
performance of joint tasks is achieved by using Commercial-Off-The-Shelves 
(COTS) and Government Off-The-Shelves (GOTS) software. The reliability and 
safety of the software is a major factor in the overall effectiveness of tactical 
operations. Impediments to safe operation of the systems will increase the risk for 
mishaps. Safe interoperability capability ensures that the mission objectives are 
achieved not only effectively but also safely.
1.2 PURPOSE
The main purpose of this research is to develop and apply a framework to analyze 
the system safety interoperability of the Navy’s complex war-fighting systems of 
systems. War-fighting systems include weapons systems, command and control 
(C2) systems, communication systems, radars, planner systems, display systems, 
ship self-defense systems, etc.
The journal model for the references herein is The American Psychologist, the journal of the 
A m erican Psvoholncrjoal A ssociation
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1.3 MOTIVATION
The factors below are the major motivators behind this research.
1.3.1 Mishap Reduction
The Center for Army Lessons Learned reports (CALL, 2003):
17 April 2002; four Canadian soldiers are killed and eight wounded when a USAF F-16 
mistakenly bombed them as the Canadians were engaging in a live-fire training exercise at night.
24 March 2003; a Patriot Missile Battery destroyed a British Tornado returning from a 
mission in Iraq. Two British pilots perish.
4 December 2001; three Special Forces soldiers and seven Afghanis were killed and 
many more injured when they mistakenly called in a air strike by a USAF B-52 on their own 
position.
6 April 2003; an USAF A-10 kills one British soldier and injures several in a friendly fire 
incident in southern Iraq.
The real life examples above show that the cost of conflicts both in terms of 
dollars and human lives is so high that it is imperative to rethink our planning 
strategy to include meeting the operational objectives with minimal cost and 
weaponry and minimal loss of lives. Hence, the requirement for interoperability 
of our systems and forces must include safety study, safety assessment and risk 
mitigation in the system of systems (SoS) environment.
In theory, any tactical operation can eventually be won if  we were to have endless 
time for fighting, unlimited budget, endless numbers and types of weaponry, and 
without any consideration for the loss of lives, friendly fires, loss of assets or 
missiles. In reality, however, the DoD faces budget cuts, manpower issues and 
has to do more with less. It needs to achieve the operational objectives with 
minimal cost and weaponry, minimal loss of lives, and in the shortest possible 
time. This requires the planners to develop the mapping of the Order of Battle 
with carefully selected participating systems for deployment. As a part of this 
selection, not only the participating systems must be able to integrate, coordinate, 
and exchange data, but they must also be able to interoperate in a safe manner.
Given the enormous impact that just one friendly fire might have in terms of loss 
of lives and the associated liabilities associated, not to mention its impact on the 
stand of the country in the global political context and its impact on the overall 
economy, reducing potential mishaps by identifying, analyzing and mitigating the 
issues of safety interoperability in the U.S. Navy’s complex systems is not only a 
good engineering practice, a technical necessity, or even a moral obligation, but a 
wise and prudent decision in terms of associated liabilities.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3
1.3.2 Designing Safe Systems
The second motivator for conducting this research is to learn how to design safety 
into the system of systems so that it becomes the “quality” or “property” of the 
system. The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense’s Defense Acquisition 
Desk Book (DoD, 2002) calls out to DoD Program Managers to, “ .. .be aware the 
process of designing safety into systems directly effects operational safety.” 
Clearly, this ‘linkage’ not only lays the foundation for a need for system safety 
analyses, but, with directly linking it to operational safety, it implies that less 
‘accidents’ in the operational phase will be the end result when safety is designed 
into the system. The handbook further adds that the Program Manager is, “to 
make safety a priority in system design” (DoD, 2002). The importance of making 
“safety” a priority in system design is often overlooked usually because of lack of 
recognition that safety is a property of a system not of the components of a 
system, and most likely because of funding constraints. Just as we design 
functional capabilities into the system so it could perform its intended mission 
(and that becomes the property of the system), we must design safety into the 
system, and thus it becomes the property of the system so it could perform its 
intended mission in a safe manner.
When we integrate heterogeneous systems (as in the case of SoS architecture), we 
change the system’s context, and by doing so, the safety properties change. When 
systems are integrated, safety attributes (safeguards, controls, etc.) of the 
components of that system may be circumvented, overridden or negated, or at 
minimum affected. It is this change and the follow-up uncertainties in the overall 
behavior of the federation that requires us to view the “health” of the system from 
safety perspective, holistically, systemically and within its new context. This 
holistic system safety study will enable the safety engineer and the development 
engineers to be qware of the dependencies between safety-related software 
artifacts and their association with the changes.
1.3.3 Understanding Software Safety
The author was also motivated by the need for “understanding” software safety. If 
we can understand the software safety, its attributes, its criteria for criticality, its 
impact on the system operations, then we can improve and elevate the safety 
quality of the system.
Understanding the software of a complex system is already an extremely difficult 
task. It requires special skills, a set of critical eyes and years of experience. To 
understand software safety, it requires all of the above, plus going beyond the 
given domain, beyond the validated limits, and with “safety glasses” firmly on.
Safety critical functions of the software must be understood fully in order to 
implement controls for risk mitigation. Software errors, dead code, run-time 
errors, timing anomalies in safety critical parts of the software could introduce a 
hazardous condition that may contribute to a mishap, such as an inadvertent
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launch or restrain firing (misfire). The Defense Acquisition Deskbook states that 
software needs to be analyzed to “identify potential system hazards contributed to 
by the software or software environment and to examine the causal factors so as 
to eliminate or mitigate the hazard risks throughout the continued development of 
the software” (DoD, 2002). Moreover, the task of understanding the software 
becomes even more crucial when we integrate COTS software among our legacy 
software in the SoS environment.
The challenge starts with various computer languages used in different systems. 
AEGIS baselines are written in CMS-2L, a Navy-unique language, and ADA. The 
Advanced Tomahawk Weapon Control Systems (ATWCS) is written in ADA-98, 
with some C. Understanding the software with safety impact in an integrated 
system of systems with diverse languages, terminologies and requirements is 
crucial in reducing the risks of mishaps during tactical operations.
1.3.4 Safety Risk Reduction /Management
The fourth motivator is to learn how to reduce and manage safety risks associated 
with the software. Risk taking is a part of the reality of everyday work, mainly 
because risk is an inherent property of today’s complex systems. A “safe” car is a 
car that is always parked in a garage (never driven.) A totally safe missile launch 
is not launching at all. Truly “safe” software is software than doesn’t “talk” to the 
outside world, so it doesn’t “make” others do something.
Now that we know we have to “live” with risk, we are obligated to understand the 
risks (i.e. to assess), to design automated safeguards/interlocks (i.e. to reduce), 
and to control them (i.e. to manage.) Although, system safety as a whole is 
considered a risk reduction approach for early identification, analysis, elimination, 
and/or control of hazards (DoD, 2002), a holistic systems safety analysis will help 
us to find ways to reduce and manage risks in the new, higher level, more 
complex system of systems.
A framework whereas system safety engineers can use to apply engineering tools 
and techniques in analysis of safety critical data is necessary and is the focus of 
this research.
1.4 THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
The current reality in Department of Defense (DoD) is that we need to do more 
with less due to the budget constraints. This means optimizing the use of legacy 
tactical systems that, at one time, were developed to perform as single systems 
with no integration or interoperability requirements. Now these heterogeneous 
systems need to integrate and interoperate to provide seamless operational 
objectives. This higher level of integration of multi-complex systems introduces 
an emergent issue- safety. The problem is that although few engineers in 
Department of the Navy have taken it upon themselves to conduct an integrated 
effort to analyze the system of systems for safety, there is no requirement,
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mandate or even a guiding standard to do so. This research attempts to identify 
and evaluate the safety issues in interoperability of complex combat systems so 
that the mission requirements can be achieved safely as well as effectively.
1.4.1 The Research Questions / Objectives
• What is system safety interoperability for the Navy’s complex combat 
systems?
• How can safety interoperability be analyzed for a Navy’s complex combat 
system?
This research has been conducted to meet the objectives listed above by using a 
real life complex system of systems, namely AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense 
(BMD) 3.0 system for analyses.
1.5 ASSUMPTIONS/ LIMITATIONS
1. The study will use only UNCLASSIFIED information.
2. The study will not attempt to resolve the safety interoperability issues.
3. The study will be limited to U.S. Navy combat systems.
4. The study will assume that complex subsystems have been through single­
system safety engineering programs.
5. This study assumes that interoperability capability is part of the design 
requirements.
6. This study will not attempt to achieve interoperability.
7. This study will be limited to software driven issue in safety related 
interoperability.
Deviation from the Proposed Plan
Based on the changes to the overall program plan of AEGIS BMD development 
(development schedule moved to the right two months), this study will use the 
AEGIS BMD 3.0 computer program for application of SSIF and the analysis of 
the system. This small change will not affect the outcome or expectations or 
quality of the analysis.
1.6 DEFINITIONS / DESCRIPTIONS 
System
System is defined as, “A set of components that act together as a whole to achieve 
a common goal” (Leveson, 1999). The components are interrelated and may have 
direct or indirect interfaces to other components. A system is part of the 
environment that it will operate. System boundary is defined and input to and 
output from the system is explicitly known. A system may contain subsystems 
and may be a part of a larger system, i.e. system of systems.
Stephans (Stephans, 2004) depicts the system as:








Figure 1.1 - System Definition
A system can be a ‘simple” system such as a clock with a few or no input, an 
output, a limited or no human interaction, no decision-making capability, and a 
limited or no interfaces to the outside world.
A system can be “complex” when the parts or components are interrelated and the 
behavior of the parts affect the overall system both negatively or positively. More 
discussion regarding complexity provided in “complex systems” below.
Safety
Every complex system has some inherent hazards by the nature of its existence 
that poses risk for its users. An automobile runs on fuel to perform its function— 
driving. Fuel being flammable in nature, is a potential source of fire that can lead 
to burning the car, killing the driver and its passengers. The probability of 
occurrence of the mishap (e.g. fire) and the severity of the mishap (killing the 
driver) is calculated. The risk level is determined by merging the probability of 
occurrence and the severity of the mishap. The “owner” of the system accepts or 
rejects the risk level. “Safety” is the level of acceptable risk (Haimes, 1998).
MIL-STD-882D defines “Safety” as: “Freedom from those conditions that can 
cause death, injury, occupational illness or damage to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to the environment (USN, 2000).”
As observed in above definition, system safety is concerned with those events 
/functions that can influence the software to be executed in such a manner that
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would contribute to the loss of life, injury, loss of ship/missiles/assets, and 
equipment.
Mishap
Mishap is an unplanned and undesirable event or series of events resulting in 
death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or loss of equipment or property, or 
damage to the environment (USN, 2004).
Safety Critical
A term applied to a condition, event, operations, process, or item, whose proper 
recognition, control, sequencing, performance or tolerance is essential for safe 
system operation or use (USN, 2004).
Safety Kernel
An independent computer program that monitors the state of the system to 
determine when potentially unsafe system states may occur, or when transitions to 
potentially unsafe system states may occur. The safety kernel is designed to 
prevent the system from entering the unsafe state, and it is designed to return it to 
a known safe state (USN, 2004).
Risk Mitigation
Risk mitigation is defined as the process of avoiding, reducing and controlling, or 
deliberately accepting risk on the program (USN, 2004).
Software Safety
Hermann offers a detailed, practical definition:
“Features and procedures which ensure that a product performs predictably under 
normal and abnormal conditions, and the likelihood of an unplanned event 
occurring is minimized and its consequences controlled and contained, thereby 
preventing accidental injury or death, whether intentional or unintentional 
(Herrmann, 1999).”
System Safety
DoD believes, “System safety engineering is an integral element of systems 
engineering involving the application of scientific and engineering principles for 
the timely identification of hazards and initiation of the actions necessary to 
eliminate/control hazards or reduce the associated risk to an acceptable level” 
(DoD, 2002).
Stephans defines system safety as, “The discipline that uses systematic 
engineering and management techniques to aid in making systems safe throughout 
their life cycles” (Stephans, 2004).
The principal objective of a system safety program within the DoD is to ensure 
that safety consistent with mission requirements is designed into systems (USN, 
2000), subsystems, equipment, and facilities. The approach to Systems Safety is
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to design-out most of the potential accident causes while the system is still on the 
drawing board (Roland, 1990). The objective can be thought of as the balance 
between risk and controls.
Embedded in the above definitions, is system safety’s role and responsibility with 
identification and mitigation of those events /functions that can influence the 
software to be executed in such a manner that would contribute to the loss of life, 
injury, loss of ship/missiles/assets, and equipment. The system safety effort is 
allocated for the system’s life cycle, that is, development, production, operation, 
maintenance and disposal. The goal in system safety effort is to optimize safety, 
that is to minimize risk. This is usually achieved by early involvement, planning 
and designing safety into the system. This approach is in contrast with “reactive” 
approach that is studying of mishaps when they occur. System safety is, in 
practice, a function of program schedule and funding. The stakeholders are in 
control of these variables, and ultimately, in control of how safe is safe enough.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
A procedure by which each credible failure mode of each item from a low 
indenture level to the highest is analyzed using inductive logic (USN, 2004).
Residual Safety Risk
The remaining mishap risk that exists after all mitigation techniques have been 
implemented or exhausted, in accordance with the system safety design order of 
precedence.
Risk
A measure of inability to achieve program objectives within defined cost and 
schedule constraints (DoD, 2003). Risk has two components: the probability of 
occurrence of a mishap, and the consequence or severity of the occurrence of a 
mishap.
Causal Factor(s)
Causal factors are the result o f poor or insufficient design, incorrect 
implementation of a good design, or potential or actual failures that would 
have to occur in order to result in the condition defined as a hazard. It is the 
probability o f individual causal factors occurring and the logical relationship 
between those causal factors that determine the hazard likelihood. The 
logical relationship indicates whether the causal factors must occur together 
or may occur independently to lead to the hazard occurrence (DoD, 2003).
Hazard
Any real potential condition that can cause injury, illness, or death to personnel, 
damage to or loss of a system’ equipment or property, or damage to the 
environment. A hazard is a prerequisite to a mishap (DoD, 2003).
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Basic relationship between hazards, their causal factors and the top-level mishap 
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Inadvertent Launch
Figure 1.2 -  Example of Fault Tree Analysis
Complex Systems/Systems of Systems
Keating, et al. (Keating C., Sousa-Posa, A., Mun, N., 2003) defines a System of 
Systems (SoS) as:
“A metasystem comprised o f multiple embedded and interrelated autonomous 
complex subsystems that can be diverse in technology, context, operation, 
geography, and conceptual frame. These complex subsystems must function as an 
integrated metasystem to produce desirable results in performance to achieve a 
higher-level mission subject to constraints. ”
There are several terminologies being used to refer to a “system of systems”. In 
DoD, terms like, “Combat System’ or “Federation System” or “Family of 
systems’ have been used. In private or academia, the term “meta-system” is used. 
All of the above terms are synonymous and refer to a larger complex system, 
made up by integration of a few single complex systems to achieve a new mission 
requirement.
The key word in the definition above is that the “sub-systems” are diverse. The 
diversity of these systems is not limited to operational nature or geography, but it 
expands to their computer languages, modeling of entities, technology, and 
environment in which they were produced to operate.
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A “complex” system, e.g. a missile system, refers to a interrelated set of entities, 
functions, components that has decision-making capabilities, has many input and 
output, has high level of human interface, and interfaces with outside world. The 
“complexity” of the system increases when we increase the number of functional 
requirements, the interfaces, and human involvement. The increase in functional 
requirements and interfaces is made possible by more hardware, software, 
firmware, and by customizing needed operating environment. The increase in 
interfaces can include other systems, other services (Navy, Air Force, Army) or 
other militaries (allies). The more complex a system gets, the more “risk” is likely 
to have, and the more “need” for a system safety analysis exists. This direct 









Figure 1.3- Complexity and Risk Relationship
The various complex systems are integrated and configured into one larger system 




Figure 1.4 -  Complex System of Systems
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System of Systems Engineering
The integration and interrelation of multiple complex systems in multiple 
platforms, geography and/or within multiple policies, creates a new generation of 
complex systems problems. System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) is an attempt 
to address these new systems problems. It is an evolution of traditional systems 
engineering. SoSE is defined as (Keating, 2002):
“The design, deployment, operation, and transformation o f higher level 
metasystems that must function as an integrated complex system to produce 
desirable results. These metasystems are themselves comprised o f multiple 
autonomous embedded complex systems that can be diverse in technology, 
context, operation, geography, and conceptual frame. ”
Alborzi (Alborzi, 2004) illustrates the evolved systems engineering in Figure 1.5. 
This figure depicts the above definition where three single complex systems (A, 
B, and C) have been developed under separate Systems Engineering (SE) process 
and are now required to interoperate together as one larger system (SoS), thus are 
required to be modified, or transformed, and integrated via a systems of systems 
engineering (SoSE) process to perform a higher level of mission requirements.
System of Systems Safety Engineering
Currently, there exist a definition for System Safety Engineering.
MIL-STD-882 (USN, 2000) defines System Safety Engineering (SSE) as:
“The application o f engineering and management principles, criteria, and 
techniques to achieve acceptable mishap risk, within the constraints o f  
operational effectiveness and suitability, time, and cost, throughout all phases o f  
the system life cycle. ”
As shown in Figure 1.5, SoS safety engineering will need to be an integrated part 
of overall SoSE.










Figure 1.5- System of Systems Engineering (SoSE)
Interoperability
Interoperability has been defined by several entities from several engineering or 
science spectrum. Here are a few:
“The interoperability is the capability o f N  heterogeneous systems to conform to a 
set o f ISO standards o f the same profile and to communicate according to these 
standards in an environment representative o f the reality ’’(Batard, 1991).
Wileden and Kaplan define interoperability from software perspective, as, “the 
ability fo r  multiple software components written in different programming 
languages (e.g. C++, JAVA, etc.,) to communicate and interact with another” 
(Wileden, 1997).
Alborzi defines the interoperability, from weapons systems perspective, as the, 
“Integration and interoperation o f  multiple new and legacy systems for new 
higher level mission requirements ” (Alborzi, 2004).
In general, interoperability is defined as, “To exchange information and perform 
joint tasks (Young, 2002).”
The understanding of the notion of interoperability can be facilitated by Figure
1.6 below. AEGIS Combat System in joint cooperative tasking with Ground- 
based Midcourse Defense program (GMD), linked with secure satellite 
communication systems performing C4I tactical operations.
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Figure 1.6- Interoperability Conceptual View (Aegis, 2004)
Safety Interoperability
Imagine a scenario where two similar systems are interconnected to pass target 
data for joint target engagement. Due to interface limitations and/or differences in 
data requirements, the two systems cannot communicate effectively. To remedy 
this “incomparability” and making these systems work together, DoD contracts a 
developer to build a “translator medium”— a communication system that can be 
added to the configuration whose function is to “translate” the target data of one 
system and present it to other system in the language or the format it understands. 
Since this intermediate system is only a communication system (no connection or 
interaction to weapons systems), it is believed to not have any safety critical 
functions, therefore it is not considered for system safety study, and the software 
development continues till completed and interconnected with the other two 
systems. Now the two systems work together well and can pass target data. 
However, under a certain and often unknown situation, a software “glitch” in the 
intermediate system, causes it to use the position coordinates of one system to be 
passed as target coordinates to the other system. The result can be catastrophic if 
engagement and the release of a weapon would proceed.
The term, “safety interoperability” is a new term developed for the purpose of this 
research. It intends to communicate the concept of interoperability from safety 
perspective. As such, there are no published formal definitions of “safety 
interoperability”; however, the author has developed the following definition:
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“A capability encompassing many o f the safety issues relative to integration, 
compatibility and interface that are impinging upon the effectiveness with which 
independent, heterogeneous and/or homogeneous systems, components or 
elements, including human factor, may safely interact ’’(Alborzi, 2004).
1.7 OVERVIEW OF THE SYSTEM SAFETY 
INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK (SSIF)
To facilitate the understanding and the usability of SSIF, we must first illustrate 
the general architecture of a complex combat system, starting first from single 
system view.
System A is a complex weapon system, e.g. a radar system, which is procured and 
developed using the traditional systems engineering (SE) processes. This means, 
the system will have a Concept of Operations (CONOPS), system requirements, 
design and production, and finally installation and maintenance. As a integrated 
part of systems engineering Integrated Product Team (IPT), as shown in Figure 
1.8, system safety engineering (SSE) will be conducting its own system-based 
engineering evaluation using the SE IPT interfaces (see Figure 1.7) and artifacts 
for the purpose of identification, elimination or control of system’s hazards. This 
evaluation is conducted near parallel to the program development. The evaluation 
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Figure 1.7- System Safety Engineering (SSE) Interactions with SE




Figure 1.8- Integration of SSE into System Engineering (SE)
System B is another complex system, perhaps a command and control (C2) 
system. This system may be legacy or new, may be in the same platform as 
System A or not. This system has most likely been through a complete SE and 
SSE also.
System C is yet another complex system, perhaps a missile system, used in the 
same platform or other than system A or B, legacy or new, and it is assumed that 
has been evaluated under its own SE and SSE.
Figure 1.9 demonstrates the complex systems which have been developed 
independently, may have different environment in which they can operate, may 
have different computer languages, different output requirements and may have 










Figure 1.9- Diverse Complex Systems
New Architecture- A System of Systems-
Systems A, B and C are configured and integrated to represent an overarching 
system- a system made up of few complex systems working and interoperating
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together as a larger more capable system. As an example of operational concept 
(CONOPS), system A may detect a target that seems to fit a threat profile, using 
communication an intelligent systems, this information is passed on to System B. 
System B evaluates the threat, conducts an identification and sends an 
engagement order to System C for prosecution.
This integration and interoperation of various complex systems working as one 
larger, more complex meta-system is made possible by a SoS engineering 
methodology. This methodology, similar to the single-system SE mentioned 
above, will employ the design and development teams, but it will have a different 
focus, attempting to solve different system problems and striving for different 
operational outcome.
On the same token, system safety engineering team will need to focus on system 
of systems architecture, and attempts to evaluate the hazards in the overall meta­
system. This will mean the safety engineering methodology used during the 
development of single systems is now inadequate in this new, larger, more 
complex, and more fluid context. SoS safety engineering (SoSSE) will need to be 
integrated and embedded into the SoSE. The underlying assumption is that the 
interoperability impediments have been resolved in SoSE (perhaps as the part of 
SoSE methodology). The example mechanisms by which this resolution is 
possible are Object-Oriented Method for Interoperability (OOMI) (Young, 2002) 
and Holistic Framework for Software Engineering (HFSE) (Puett, 2003).
Figure 1.10 shows the integration of SoSSE into overarching system engineering 
process- SoSE for this new architecture. The new safety engineering interactions 
is demonstrated in Figure 1.11.
SoSE
SoSSE
Figure 1-10 - Integrated SoS Safety Engineering
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System Safety Interoperability Framework
A new framework is needed to ensure the application of engineering techniques 
and analyses to the overall Navy’s SoS to identify and eliminate hazards that 
impede the proper interoperation of safety critical data (SCD) or functions. Safety 
critical functions are those whose improper operations (or failure of operations) 
may contribute or lead to a mishap. This framework will integrate SoS Safety 
Engineering (SoSSE) into the SoS Engineering (SoSE) discipline, so that we can 
ensure the implementation of SoS requirements with safety impact, and design in 
the safety nets necessary to preclude the unsafe operation of SCD during the 
interaction of various diverse complex systems. The System Safety 
Interoperability Framework (SSIF) will provide us this vision, and it is illustrated 
in Figure 1.12.


























Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
20
1.8 RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND SIGNIFICANCE
1.8.1 Accomplishment of Research Objectives
The review of this dissertation will reveal that the research objectives listed in 
paragraph 1.3.1 have been accomplished.
1.8.2 Contributions
The analysis of system safety interoperability has made the following 
contributions to the “Practice” segment of Body of Knowledge:
a. Identification and evaluation of the safety issues in external 
interfaces and external interactions provides a basis for focused 
and orchestrated safety analysis from total system perspective.
b. The analysis of the focused area in project management team will 
translate into allocating the right resources (both from expertise 
and funding perspective); this means doing the necessary work 
with optimum efficiency.
c. Identification of the safety attributes of the system that are affected 
by the integration into a system of systems. The safety attributes 
are those features, design constraints, etc. that define the safety in 
system context.
d. The “building blocks” created by this research and the analytical 
methods used will provide more insight into the safety 
interoperability issues than has traditional methods.
e. The System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) can be used 
for mishaps risk reduction purposes.
f. Risk reduction noted in “e” above will translate into saving lives of 
our war-fighters by reducing and eventually eliminating friendly 
fire accidents.
The contributions to the “Theory” segment of Body of Knowledge include:
a. Defining and documenting, for the safety interoperability impediments 
in a combat system tactical environment. This will aid the future 
design engineers in designing safety during development of complex 
systems.
b. Posit a statement of system safety interoperability for the Navy’s 
combat systems.
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c. The advancement of “System Thinking” by proving, through scientific 
analyses, that interoperability capability is not just a performance issue 
but also a safety issue that needs to be included in all systemic
evaluations. The new “improved” systems thinking will enable us to
identify processes that have potential in solving complex problems, 
will also enable us to have control over the “health” of the system.
1.8.3 Significance
The significance of this analysis lies in its somewhat ‘invisible’ yet crucial role in 
development of weapons systems and their use in tactical operations. Primarily, 
the following lists the significance of study:
a. Originality of Concept- Interoperability is not just a Performance issue,
but also a safety issue. Although DoD have initiated the effort in 
understanding and implementing interoperability requirements in today’s 
complex systems, the system safety dimension of it has not been studied 
or even acknowledged.
b. A new leap into system safety engineering. Up to this point, system safety 
engineering had a single-system-based approach. No provisions, tools or 
processes or standards exist for combat system of systems architecture. No 
scholarly analysis of system safety interoperability in the Navy’s systems 
of systems tactical environment has ever been conducted.
c. Risk Reduction/Management- The analysis with this depth and breath will 
have significant impact on how engineers design safety into the systems, 
so safety can become the property of the meta-system. Safe systems have 
inherently low risk for mishaps. This will translate into lower number of 
friendly fires, inadvertent launch, or launch based on misinformation, 
miscommunication, etc.
d. System safety being advanced in “systems thinking”. The advanced 
systems thinking will lead to the development of systems theory, 
application methods and finally in higher systems thinking.
1.9 DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
This dissertation is organized in a way to facilitate the reader’s understanding of 
concepts through the development of the SSIF and through the analysis of the use 
case, Ballistic missile Defense (BMD) 3.0 program
Chapter I introduces the readers to the concept of interoperability and system 
safety, and why we need a well-undertaken scholarly research on the subject. It 
points out the complexity of the new architecture- namely systems of systems and
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the need for a more structured, safe and reliable way of procuring and using 
weapon systems.
This chapter also presents a brief overview of the SSIF, and it provides the 
definitions of terms and concepts, the purpose of study, the objectives and the 
contributions made by this research.
Chapter II presents a survey of current literature in the field. The literature review 
is divided into three parts:
a) System of systems
b) System safety
c) Interoperability
As a major part of this section, the “gap” in literature is determined and presented. 
Previous advancements in the area of interoperability such as Holistic Framework 
for Software Engineering (HFSE) and Object-Oriented Model for Interoperability 
(OOMI) is discussed and used as foundation in this research.
Additionally, in Chapter II, the system safety interoperability issues are identified 
as the result of literature review.
Chapter III presents the System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) in 
detail. Included in this presentation are the SSIF characterization attributes and 
what each attribute entails.
Chapter IV presents the analysis conducted for AEGIS BMD 3.0 program using 
SSIF. As a part of analysis, the chosen “abbreviated” methodology used for the 
analysis will be discussed. The “findings” will be stated as well.
The results are also provided in this chapter. This chapter also includes the system 
safety interoperability statement that is “emerged” as the result of analysis. This 
statement will be a significant contribution to the engineering community, in 
particular, to the safety community.
Chapter V covers the conclusion and recommendations. In this chapter an 
overview of the research is presented. The purpose and the research questions are 
reviewed. It is evidenced that the objectives of the research, research questions 
and the purpose were satisfied. Moreover, the contributions and the significance 
of the research are presented, and recommendations for future scholarly study and 
research are provided.
Appendix A provides the official authorization from U.S. Navy to use the BMD 
program for this analysis and to publish this dissertation.
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Appendix B contains the written approval and validation of SSIF by three subject 
matter experts. This appendix includes the processes, the criteria used, and a brief 
biography of each expert.




“Its mistakes o f commission have been legion; and its mistakes o f omission have 
been even greater. It has all too often done nothing when it should have realized 
that problems cannot be avoided by refusing to admit they exist. ”
Harry S. Truman 
U.S. Senate Special Committee to 
Investigate the National Defense program 
January 1942
2.1 COMPLEX SYSTEMS OF SYSTEMS
The engineering of complex systems of systems has received special importance 
in recent years. Systems of systems or combat systems terminology is now widely 
used to describe the combined operation of many platforms, weapon systems, and 
communication systems to achieve an overall joint tactical objective in military 
operations. The increased complexity is felt at all levels of command.
General Sheehan, former Commander in Chief of U.S. Atlantic Forces, in 1997, 
said,
“Victory will depend on the ability to master the ‘system o f systems ’ composed o f 
multi-service hard-and sot-kill capabilities linked by advanced information 
technologies. ”
The concept of systems of systems came about as a cost imitigator\ How can we 
use the synergism available by combining the strengths of each system towards a 
broader mission objective? The answer is system of systems integration.
2.1.1 System of Systems Engineering
To create a new system of systems, we need to have a system of systems 
engineering.
Keating, et.al., states that System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) is in its 
embryonic stages of development (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003). 
Traditional systems engineering approaches have been successful in addressing 
the complex system problems with technical solutions (Sage, 2000).
However, there have been new complex problems emerging that do not have 
single technical solutions, but a “satisficing” outcome (Alborzi, 2004). Keating, 
et. al. attempt to establish a foundation for SoSE methodology on which these 
new system problems can be addressed and resolved (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and
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Mun, 2003). Table 2.1 (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003) shows the 
progression of development of systems of systems engineering.
TABLE 2.1- Development of Systems of Systems Engineering Capability
Level Development Area System(s) of Systems Engineering 
Development
1 Supporting Systems 
Engineering Processes, 
Tools, and Methods
The systematic approaches and supporting 
tools that facilitated the accomplishment of 
systems engineering by individuals units, and 
organizations.
2 SoSE Principles The fundamental laws that govern, define, 
explain, and predict the structure, behavior or 
performance of systems of systems.
3 SoSE Local Applications The performance of system of systems 
engineering for a specific problems or issue 
in a localized setting.
4 SoSE Methodology A generalized and theoretically grounded 
framework that guides the orderly design, 
assessment, or transformation of a system of 
systems.
5 Systemic SoSE 
Philosophy
A fundamental worldview based in systems 
principles that drive decision, action, and 
interpretation in all aspects of system of 
systems engineering.
6 SoSE Culture The artifacts, values and beliefs, and 
fundamental assumptions that permeate the 
accomplishment of SoSE in a unit or 
organization.
7 SoSE Research Engagement in the rigorous study of SoSE to 
generate, acquire, interpret, and disseminate 
knowledge to enhance the performance of 
SoSE.
In addition, Sousa Posa and Keating (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003) 
provide guiding system principles for SoSE methodology development. These are 
Systems Principles that need to be in consideration for basis of SoSE 
methodology development. To clarify this idea, these guiding principles are 
intended to stimulate thinking, enhance understanding, and provide an insight into 
the foundations for the SoSE methodology (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 
2003). These are:
• Compatibility
• Minimum Critical Specification





• System Outcome Achievement
• Complex Systems transformations
• Iteration





A SoSE methodology provides a basis from which a new system Federation can 
be designed and deployed, or an existing Federation can be transformed (Keating, 
Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003). This methodology is intended to be flexible and not 
prescriptive as traditional system engineering methods (Gibson, 1991), and it is 
intended to be able to adjust to new emergent problems unique to SoSE.
Keating and Sousa-Posa have attempted to lay the groundwork for a SoSE 
methodology that is clear and guiding, yet not prescriptive, general and high- 
level, yet with sufficient details that would enable the engineers to guide the 
resolution of a complex systems engineering problem, and moves the engineers 
forward, yet not in linear manner, but in iterative, spiral manner. Figure 2.1 
depicts the initial attempt in developing a SoSE methodology by Keating and 
Sousa-Posa (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003).




Figure 2.1- System of Systems Engineering Methodology
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2.2 INTEROPERABILITY
The interoperability is defined as:
The ability o f systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services 
from other systems, units or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable 
them to operate effectively together (Pridmore, 2000).
Col. Marek Amanowicz, from Military University of Technology in Poland, 
provides one of the few interoperability models available. He focuses on one of 
the many dimensions of interoperability, and that is the Communications and 
Information Systems.
Figure 2.2 (Amanowicz, 1996) shows the concept of interoperability modeling.
U.S. Navy’s legacy systems were developed in centralized (Aiken, 1994), 
terminal to host architecture (Chia-Chu, 2001). Typically, the entire system 
functionality was placed on the mainframes. Chia-chu (Chia-Chu, 2001) 
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Figure 2.2- Concept of Interoperability Modeling
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Figure 2.3- A Centralized Computing Environment for Legacy Systems
For U.S. Navy’s AEGIS legacy baselines these mainframe were UYK-7s and 
UYK-40s. Application processing logic, the data resources and 
displays/presentations were all hosted on the mainframe. The application was 
tightly integrated in millions lines of source code rather than in smaller, modules. 
Changing legacy systems software is a nightmare, because thousand of lines may 
be affected by changing a 10-line function. In recent years, however, U.S. Navy 
has begun transforming its systems to a more distributed, object-based 
architecture. The first of these initiatives were conversion of legacy systems, 
written in Navy exclusive language, CMS-2 to Ada. The Commercial-Off-The - 
Shelves (COTS) hardware replaces the old UYKs. And recently, the Navy is 
moving toward converting its system to Open Architecture, using Object Oriented 
Architectural Design (0 0 AD). Middleware such as Common Object Request 
Broker Architecture (CORBA), Component Object Model/ Distributed 
Component Object Model (COM/DCOM) and Java RMI make the migration of 
the legacy system to a heterogeneous distributed computing environment possible 
(Chia-Chu, 2001).
AEGIS Combat System approach in distributing its computing applications 
includes using Java.
With requirement of interoperability in forefront of U.S. Navy war-fighting 
strategy, the transformation and use of new and legacy systems in a different 
environment, under totally different contextual requirements is inevitable.
Various aspects of interoperability requirement have been researched. For 
example, the development of a large-scale interoperable database system, 
operating in a dynamic environment has been addressed by many researchers. 
This interoperable database system should provide uniform access to 
heterogeneous information sources (Ling, 1997). Li and McLeod write on the 
importance of management of the inherent interdependencies among data in 
different databases, in supporting information sharing in federated database 
systems (McLeod, Li, 1993). They note that data in such databases can implicitly 
and/or explicitly exhibit various forms of interdependence, such as existence,
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structural, and functional/ behavioral dependencies. The ability to capture and 
systematically support, such intrinsic interdependency relationship is essential 
systems (McLeod, Li, 1993).
There seem to be two solutions for the problem of interoperability—integrated 
systems and open systems. This thought leads us to our next discussion, the 
Object-Oriented Model for Interoperability that will show the balance between 
‘opening’ the systems and integrating them to allow seamless interoperation to 
occur between legacy, new or hybrid systems. However, before that, it is 
necessary to review the root causes behind un-interoperability, that is the causes 
of heterogeneities and what are the consequences of integrating the heterogeneous 
systems that were developed independently in isolation and with no 
interoperability requirement in the first place. Paragraphs 2.2.1 and 2.2.2 will 
address these issues and will offer a method for resolution.
2.2.1 Causes of un-interoperability
In Figure 2.4, Young (Young, 2002) provides an example of how war-fighting 
systems may be interconnected to provide a larger system with an increased 
capability than any of subsystems.
As shown in the figure, the forward observer’s Battlefield Digital Assistant 
(BDA), implemented on a Palm wireless hand-held device, represents the target 
using a MechanizedCombatVehicle record structure with elements mcvType used 
to indicate whether the vehicle is a tank, personnel carrier, or reconnaissance 
vehicle; mcvLocation provides the vehicle’s location using Military Grid 
Reference System (MGRS) coordinates; mcvTime giving the time of observation 
at the specified location in Local Mean Time (LMT); and mcvRadius specifying 
the maneuvering range of the vehicle in kilometers (km).
The Command and Control, Computers, Communication and Intelligence (C4I) 
system within the federation, represent the same target using an 
ArmoredMilitary Vehicle structure containing elements designation specifying the 
type of the vehicle (main battle tank, missile launcher, armored personnel carrier), 
position element that provided the vehicle’s coordinated using latitude and 
longitude; and time in Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) providing the moment when 
the vehicle was observed. Its application is most likely written in C++.
The third system in the federation, e.g. Tomahawk Planning System, written in 
Ada, and uses ArmoredFightingVehicle record structure to model the targeted 
tank. The record includes afvClassification specifying the type of vehicle (battle 
tank, rocket launcher, truck), ajvLocation providing the vehicle coordinates using 
latitude and longitude, afvObsTime giving the time of observation of the vehicle 
at the specified location in GMT, and afcStatus indicating whether the vehicle is 
operational, damaged or destroyed.
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Figure 2.4- Impediments to Systems Interoperability (Young, 2002)
Batinin offers the following root causes for modeling differences.
Causes of Data Modeling Differences
Batinin, et. al., (Batinin, Lenzerini, 1986) describes three different causes for 
representational heterogeneity:
Different perspective. The different needs of users, program managers, and 
design teams can lead to differences in data representation even when modeling 
the same information.
Equivalent constructs. Equivalent models of the same real-world domain can be 
created using different combination of the same basic modeling constructs.
Incompatible design specification. Different application design specifications can 
result in different database schemas for the same real-world domain.
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Although Batinin cited these causes in the context of database schema integration, 
they also apply to the types of model heterogeneity that is evident in complex 
systems.
Kinds of Data Modeling Differences
Several authors have noted the modeling differences in databases used in 
heterogeneous systems. Wiederhold (Wiederhold, 1993) developed seven classes 
of heterogeneity. Although these were defined for database systems, they also 
apply to complex systems of systems with interoperability requirement. Young 
(Young, 2002) adds a new kind- the “heterogeneity of structure” to the list. 
Therefore, the classifications of modeling differences include:
• Heterogeneity of Hardware and Operating Systems
• Heterogeneity of Organizational Models
• Heterogeneity of Structure
• Heterogeneity of Presentation
• Heterogeneity of Meaning
• Heterogeneity of Scope
• Heterogeneity of Level of Abstraction
• Heterogeneity of Temporal Validity
Heterogeneity of Hardware and Operating Systems
These are differences in operating systems and the hardware used when new, 
legacy or hybrid complex systems are integrated. The speed in technology 
advances makes this problem a certain one in a federation of systems. The 
hardware platform differences include how the same information is displayed in 
different systems, such as the size, length, and format of the data. The differences 
in operating systems have been a more “familiar” problem. In DoD, the two most 
utilized operating systems in the world of COTS are Microsoft Window and 
UNIX products.
Heterogeneity of Organizational Models
The organizational modeling difference refers to differences in the conceptual 
modes used by independently developed complex systems. In the context of 
database systems, the organizational modeling differences refer to differences in 
database model such as hierarchical, relational, universal or object structured 
(Hammer, 1999). In interoperability, it refers to differences in analysis and design 
principles used such as Object-Oriented Analysis and Design (OOAD) or 
structured analysis approach (Pressman, Young, 2001).
Heterogeneity of Structure
This modeling difference refers to differences in structural composition, schema, 
or implied vs. explicitly stated information. Young (Young, 2002) explains that 
this difference can arise when a real-world entity is modeled as an object on one 
system and as attribute in another, e.g. such as an aircraft route being modeled as 
an attribute of an aircraft mission object on one system (as one element of the
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overall mission) and as a separate entity used for de-conflicting missions in 
another (Holowczak, 1996). It will be shown later that “de-confliction” is a safety 
critical issue.
The heterogeneity of structure also refers to concepts being modeled differently in 
the schemas of corresponding systems, e.g. a relationship that is modeled as one 
to one in one schema and one-to many in another (Hammer, 1999). This type of 
mismatch is especially apparent in Identification friend or Foe (IFF) interrogation 
tasks. IFF processing is noted later in this section as a safety related issue.
Heterogeneity of Presentation
This heterogeneity is related to domain mismatch problems such as different units 
o f measurement, difference in precision, disparate data types, and different field 
lengths or issues of constraint integrity. An example is when one system measures 
the position in latitude and longitude, and another system measures the position 
with Military grid Reference System (MGRS) (Hammer, 1999). Systems may also 
use different units of measure when quantifying the same object such as yards in 
one system and meter in another. Disparate data types refer to when a system 
represents a phone number as an integer and another system uses alphabet (a 
string of characters) for the same object. Systems may use different length for 
their words (Wiederhold, 1993), for example one system may provide a 20 
character description of a function, the other may choose to use only ten 
characters. Different systems may employ different constraints on the same 
parameter, for example one system may choose a 50 miles range away from the 
own-ship to be the safe zone, and another may choose a 30 mile range for the 
same parameter.
Heterogeneity of Meaning
This heterogeneity relates to problems with spoken language, the semantics and 
syntaxes. Homonyms is using the same word to convey different meanings, and 
synonyms are different words that have the same meaning. The use of 
abbreviations by different systems is included in this heterogeneity, for example, 
a system may use “POS” for position, and another system may use “PSIT” to 
refer to the position of an object.
Heterogeneity of Scope
This heterogeneity refers to the scope of information being used by different 
systems for the same entity. These differences can arise from different 
perspectives on what needs to be captured by a given application about the real- 
world object (Wiederhold, 1993, Holowczak, 1996).
For example, a logistics management system (Young, 2002) may use attributes 
like fuelCapacity and ammunitionStatus for a battle tank, and a Command and 
Control (C2) system is likely to use weaponRange and defensiveArmor in its tank 
model.
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Heterogeneity of Level of Abstraction
This heterogeneity refers to differences in the level of abstraction given to an 
object being modeled. For example, one system may sum profits earned in a 
monthly total, and another system may aggregates the same basic idea in yearly 
total (Wiederhold, 1993).
Heterogeneity of Temporal Validity
The modeling difference arises from differences in the time used by two models 
to observe or record the state of a real-world entity (Young, 2002). These 
temporal validity issues are particularly an issue with military C4I systems 
(Holowczak, 1996, Wiederhold, 1993). For example in one C4I system, the 
satellite picture of a threat area may be kept for a month to be valid (and be used), 
and the same picture in another system may kept for a year to be valid (and used). 
Validity of this real-world entity may have further implications depending on how 
it is used.
2.2.2 Object-Oriented Method for Interoperability
Paul Young provides a method for resolving the causes of un-interoperability. In 
Paragraph 2.2.1, the various kinds of heterogeneity in legacy systems are 
explained in detail. These heterogeneities cause the systems to be unable to 
interoperate effectively with each other. Young elected an approach that included 
aspects from formulae, ontology, and model methodologies to provide the 
optimum benefit in resolving heterogeneities among a federation o f independently 
developed systems (Young, 2002). This approach is called Object-Oriented 
Method for Interoperability (OOMI) and is based on a model o f the real-world 
entities whose state and behavior are shared among systems. The OOMI will be 
used in this research to serve as foundation on which System Safety 
Interoperability Framework will stand, and so it will be discussed here in great 
detail.
The OOMI methodology includes Federation Ontology to provide a canonical 
representation for the shared information, and utilizes formulae-based methods for 
resolving differences between components and canonical representations of the 
shared information (Young, 2003). This method takes advantage of the following 
capabilities:
• Object-Oriented Analysis and Design (OOAD)
• Federation Interoperability Object Model (FIOM)
• Integrated Development Environment (IDE)
• Translators
OOAD - provides principles of abstraction, information hiding, and inheritance 
that can be employed in the resolution of differences among independently 
developed systems (Khoshafian, Abnous, 1995, Walsh, Couch, 2000).
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FIOM - provides an abstract model of the real-world entities whose state and 
behavior is shared among federation systems, hiding the details of how that 
information is modeled on different systems, except when required for difference 
resolution. It is constructed prior to runtime. FIOM provides the different 
component system models of the shared real-world entities with their abstract 
model in order to facilitate resolutions. It also provides the means for resolving 
modeling differences among systems, and it is intended to be extensible, that is, 
adding new entities to the federation or including new component system models 
of a real-world entity, shall not affect contents or relationships in an existing 
model.
IDE - Construction of a FIOM for a large system of systems can be time- 
consuming task as well as prone to error. An Integrated Development 
Environment (IDE) can automate this process (Young, 2002).
Translators- since the resolution of heterogeneity needs to be resolved during 
runtime, and FIOM is constructed prior to the runtime, there is a need for 
translators that can act as intermediaries between federation systems and translate 
the FIOM input during runtime.
Figure 2.5 provides an outline of OOMI (Young, 2002).
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Figure 2.5- Object-Oriented Method for Interoperability (OOMI)
The key components are described in the following section in more detail.
OOMI Components:
IDE
In order to resolve heterogeneities among systems, a model of the real-world 
entities involved in the interoperation, is constructed prior to the runtime. This 
model is FIOM as stated earlier. IDE is used to assist the construction of FIOM. 
IDE is GUI-based and it is used to (Young, 2002):
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• Identify the real-world entities involved in the interoperation of systems in 
a federation.
• Specify the different views of a real-world entity resulting from dissimilar 
component system perspectives of the attributes and operations required to 
model an entity.
• Define a “standard” federation representation for each real-world entity 
view identified and establish the relationship between the “standard” view 
representation and various subsystem view representations.
• Construct an inheritance hierarchy relating the different views of a real 
world entity.
• Manage ontology of terms and representations for the Federation to be 
used for defining the “standard” federation representation of the real- 
world entities whose state and behavior are shared among federation 
systems.
• Define the transformation required to translate between sub-system and 
“standard” representations of a view.
• Generate system-specific information to be used by a translator to resolve 
modeling differences between sub-systems during their runtime 
operations.
IDE allows the engineer to extract, from external interfaces, the entities that will 
be involved in interoperation. Each federation entity (FE) construction is assisted 
by Federation Ontology containing the accepted terminology and representation 
to be used for defining the federation model of the real-world entity specified by 
an FE. Moreover, the IDE provides functionality for accessing and modifying the 
Federation Ontology during FIOM construction (Young, 2002).
Additionally, correlation software is used during the FIOM construction to 
establish relationships between different views of a FE. This will define the 
inheritance hierarchy that will be used by FIOM.
After different representation, views of an FE is identified, the transformations 
required to translate between representations must be defined. IDE uses a GUI- 
based matching process (Young, 2002) to provide automated transformation 
development, and the maintenance of the translation library for future use.
The class transformation and relationship information is extracted from FIOM for 
each subsystem.
NOTE: Detailed description of IDE functions can be accessed by obtaining the 
cited reference.
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FIOM
To understand and appreciate the capability of FIOM in constructing the real- 
world entity of system federation, it is necessary to review paragraph 2.2.1- i.e., 
the kinds of modeling differences that can occur in heterogeneous systems.
The heterogeneities of independently developed systems included (Young, 2002):






• Level of Abstraction
• T emporal V alidity
When two systems use different features to model the same real-world entity, then 
two systems are said to have different views of that entity. When two systems use 
the same features to model a real-world entity, it can be said that the two systems 
have the same view of the entity. The two systems that have the same view of a 
real-world entity can model that entity in different ways, that is, the two systems 
have different representations.
A view is defined in OOMI as tuple (Ae, Oe) (Young, 2002) of attribute and 
operation sets used to model the state and behavior, respectively, of the real-world 
entity involved in the interoperation. Specifically:
• Ae stands for the attributes Aei...Aen contained in the model of a real 
world entity and are exposed to other models in the federation.
• Qe stands for the operations Qei...Den defined in the real-world entity 
model and are available for invocation by external models. Each operation 
can have parameters such as pi,...,pn that can convey the information 
needed for computation.
Differing views of one real-world entity is shown in Figure 2.6 (Young, 2002).
NOTE: More details can be obtained in the cited reference.
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Figure 2.6- Differing Views of an Entity
Different Representation of the same view is pictured in Figure 2.7 (Young, 
2002).
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Figure 2.7 Differing Representations of same View
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An example of FIOM for a ground combat vehicle is shown in Figure 2.8 (Young, 
2002).
Federation Interoperability Object Model (FIOM)
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Figure 2.8- Federation Interoperability Object Model
NOTE: Readers can obtain more details on the composition and construction of 
FIOM by obtaining the cited reference.
Translator
The ultimate task of resolving the differences in views and representations of real- 
world entities by federation systems lies with the translator. The interoperability 
object model constructed prior to runtime will be used by the translator during 
runtime to resolve the differences. The translator will be the intermediary between 
subsystems. It can be implemented as a Wrapper, or as standalone ‘hub’ between 
subsystems.
Figure 2.9 shows an overview of translator as software wrapper and its 
relationship to FIOM (Young, 2002).
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Figure 2.9- Translator-FIOM Interactions
For information exchange, the source system provides the information in the form 
of a set of attributes or objects in its own format. This information will then be 
converted into the expectant format, which is the format that the receiving system 
expects. For joint task operations, the method of translation is the same.
NOTE; Readers can obtain more details on the Translator by accessing the noted 
reference.
2.2.3 Holistic Framework for Software Engineering
Holistic Framework for Software Engineering (HFSE) provides the collaborative 
mechanism (Puett, 2003) needed for heterogeneous software development tools 
and models to interoperate. This framework resolves the compatibility issues, as 
well as synergy “inadequacy” of software development tools that strive to 
improve individual aspects of their software development in the spirit of 
competition.
HFSE is both a framework (a conceptual one) and a methodology that can be used 
to trace the dependencies, both the type and the degree of dependency, of 
software development artifacts. The HFSE is also used to quantify and deploy the 
artifacts via middleware. HFSE enables this overarching collaborative capability 
by integrating the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) with the Relational 
Hypergraph (RH) Model of software evolution (Puett, 2003). This integration
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allows the system dependencies to be automatically tracked throughout the 
development cycle, and to document decision-making criteria and details for 
future engineers in modification efforts.
The potential benefit of HFSE to system safety is the basis for using this 
framework in this research. The potential benefits stem from the fact, that a 
holistic model will be able to identify the safety critical software and their effects 
automatically more reliably and quickly than an engineer, and the dependencies of 
software functions with safety impact can be traced throughout the development 
domain.
HFSE is the holistic framework that is established by embedding the relevant 
portions of QFD methodology into the already existing Relational hypergraph 
Computer-Aided Software Evolution model, then integrating this extended 
evolution model into FIOM created from tools and models used by development 
team.
The holistic framework can be viewed as an abstract layer of activity that interacts 
with subordinate software development tools via middleware communication 
tools. Figure 2.10 depicts this framework.
SWEngr
Holistic Framework
Figure 2.10- Holistic Model of Software Process Interaction (Puett, 2003)
In this section, an overview of HFSE will be provided, however, for more details 
into the QFD and RH, it is recommended to obtain the cited reference.
HFSE Components
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a. QFD- System Requirements account for one third of program risk associated 
with developments. The problem range from ambiguity of requirements to proper 
implementation of them. Lack of user input during the requirement development 
is also a significant problem area. Standish group (1994) (Puett, 2003) reports the 
three most experienced factors that can cause challenges for software 
development. These are: 1) lack of user input: 13% of all projects, 2) incomplete 
requirements and specifications: 12% of all projects, and 3) changing 
requirements and specifications: 12% of all projects. These factors produce the 
most errors in design, and for DoD, the changes and fixes can be very costly. 
QFD is a requirement-based methodology that is designed to overcome the above 
problems; namely, 1) to ensure that the user’s requirements and input are captured 
throughout the development phase, 2) to ensure that there is no loss of 
development information (this is important feature since software engineers come 
and go), and 3) to ensure that different teams in the development are in concert 
with each other in developing what customer has required.
QFD, integrated in the software development evolution process, enables the 
software engineers to have visibility over all aspects o f development effort, and 
allows them to work in a more coordinated, quality-based spirit and to make 
better decision and produce better products.
Last but not least, the QFD has been a successful methodology used to adequately 
manage safety critical requirements for complex space systems (Dean, 1992) by 
ensuring that safety requirements are adequately and completely deployed 
throughout the life-cycle development.
b. RH
The relational hypergraph model for computer-aided software evolution model 
was established by Ham (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and Kemple, 1999). This model 
establishes dependencies and links between software artifacts. In relational 
hypergraph, activities and artifacts affected by the software evolution are called 
objects and consist of “steps” and components. It uses a hierarchical refinement 
(top-level objects, refined objects, atomic objects) to link these objects and 
establish dependencies (Puett, 2003).
Criteria for dependency are recorded within the object attributes. For example, 
step attribute may consist of version and variation number, status, predecessor, 
priority, deadline manager, and evaluator. Component attribute may have version 
and variation number, hypertext, code, data, pictures, and charts (Ham, Berzins, 
Luqi, and Kemple, 1999).
Definitions in RH Model
Definition 1. (Hypergraph) (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and Kemple, 1999) A 
(directed) hypergraph is a tuple H  = (N, E, I, O) where
1. A  is a set of nodes,
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2. E  is a set of hyper edges,
3. / :  E —> 2n is a function giving the set of inputs of each hyperedge, and
4. O : E —> 2n is a function giving the set of outputs of each hyperedge.
Definition 2. (Evolutionary Hypergraph) (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and Kemple, 
1999).
An evolutionary hypergraph is a labeled, directed, and acyclic hypergraph 
H  = (N , E, I, O) together with labeling functions LN : N  —>C and Le :E->  A 
such that:
1. The elements of N  represent unique identifiers for software evolution 
components,
2. The elements of E  represent unique identifiers for software evolution steps,
3. The functions I  and O give the inputs and outputs of each software evolution 
step, such that 0(e) n  O(e') * 0  => e = e'
4. The function LN labels each node with component attributes from the set C, 
including the corresponding version of the software evolution component;
5. The function Le labels each edge with step attributes from the set A, including 
the current status of the software evolution step, such that A -  {s,d} • A' (that 
is, each element of A has the form (s, o') or (d, a ') , where a 'e  A').
Definition 3. (Relational Hypergraph) (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and Kemple, 
1999).
An evolutionary hypergraph H  = (N, E, I, O) is called a relational 
hypergraph if  and only if for every hyperedge e in H  and every input node n in 
1(e), the relationship between n and e is primary Jnput or secondary Jnput.
Definition 4. (Primary and Secondary Dependency) (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and 
Kemple, 1999).
If an input node and an output node to an evolutionary hyperedge that are 
different versions of the same component exist, then the path from the input node 
via the hyperedge to the output node of the step is called a primary-input-driven 
path, and the relationship between the input node and the step is called a 
primary_input dependency. If an input node and an output node of an 
evolutionary hyperedge exist that are different components, then the path from the 
input node via the hyperedge to the output node is called a secondary-input driven
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path, and the relationship between the input node and the step is called a 
secondary_input dependency.
Definition 5. (Top-Level Evolution Step) (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and Kemple, 
1999).
Let H  = (N, E, I, O) be an evolutionary hypergraph. A hyperedge e e E  is 
called a top-level evolution step if and only if the hyperedge e has no parent 
evolution step.
Definition 6. (Atomic Evolution Step) (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and Kemple, 1999). 
Let H  = (N , E, I, O) be an evolutionary hypergraph. A hyperedge e e E  is
called an atomic evolution step if and only if the hyperedge e cannot be expanded 
to additional steps and its output set has at most one component.
Definition 7. (Top-level Evolutionary Hypergraph) (Ham, Berzins, Luqi, and 
Kemple, 1999).
A top-level evolutionary hypergraph is an evolutionary hypergraph 
H  = {N, E, I, O) , each of whose hyperedges is a top-level evolution step.
NOTE: Readers are invited to refer to the cited reference (both HAR99 and 
PUE03) for more detailed information on hypergraph models.
c. FIOM
FIOM was extensively discussed in Paragraph 2.2.2. For HFSE, the heterogeneity 
of scope and representation are two important points that are directly applicable to 
mapping multiple software engineering tools to each other. HFSE uses OOMI 
FIOM resolution of different levels of abstraction for information provided in 
different tools and models.




The objective of system safety is (USN, 2000) to achieve acceptable mishap risk 
through a systematic approach of hazard analysis, risk assessment, and risk 
management. This objective is achieved by getting involved early in development 
in order to influence the design of the system and eliminate safety critical issues 
from ever becoming part of the design.
Safety critical functions or issues refer to those functions, lines of code, hazardous 
conditions that can contribute to death, injury to friendly forces, or damage to 
assets, equipment, and the environment.
2.3.2 Authority
• DoD Directive 6055.9 —Requires services to maintain an explosives 
safety program (USN, 1986).
• NAVSEAINST 5450.117- Assigns Technical Authority to NOSSA 
(WSESRB) (USN, 1986).
• Section 172 of Title 10, United States Code—Requires DoD to establish 
and maintain an explosives safety Program (USN, 1986).
• OPNAVINST 8020.14/ MCO P8020.ll- Explosive Safety Policy and 
NAVSEA serve as Department of the Navy Technical Authority for 
Explosive safety (USN, 1986).
2.3.3 Background
The need for designed-in safety goes back to early 1900s. Hanson, back in 1915, 
wrote:
Forgetfulness, for example, is not a crime deserving o f capital 
punishment; it is one o f the universal frailties o f  humanity. The problem is, 
therefore, to destroy as far as possible the interrelationship between safety and 
the universal human shortcomings, which can be done by designing the 
safeguards on machines and equipment so that i f  a man’s acts are so essential to 
safety, it becomes mechanically necessary for him to perform this act before 
proceeding with his task (Hansen, 1915).
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WWII reinforced the need for increased effort in safety following the increase in 
manufacturing heavy machines, and the associated accidents. The loss of human 
lives and equipment were so high that the Allies were in danger of losing the war 
(Leveson, 1999).
Ted Ferry (Ferry, 1984) wrote:
Not so well known is that for a while, accidents in the workplace were 
nearly negating the increased production. We were losing twice as many aircraft 
to training accidents as in combat., worldwide. In nearly all theaters o f operation, 
ground and air accidents were three times those o f the combat losses .
The effort to design safeguards in the system was abandoned when the war ended.
Post WWII safety approach was called, “fly-fix-fly”. An aircraft would be 
designed and flown until problems surface (or until crashed), then the problems 
would be fixed, and then flown again.
But with nuclear weapons and space travel, the accidents were going to be 
catastrophic, and thus this fly-fix-fly or trial-and-error evolved to a more focused, 
early safety program (Stephans, 2004).
Figure 2.11- FLY-FIX-FLY Approach
The first formal system safety program was established for the US Air Force 
development of Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) in 1962. In 1963 US
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Air Force published the MIL-S-38130, “general requirement for Safety 
Engineering of Systems and Associated subsystems and equipment.” DoD 
adopted MIL-S-38130 as MIL-S-381308A in 1966; then it revised it and 
designated MIL-STD-882B, “System Safety Program Requirements” in 1969.
System Safety requirements of the Air Force was the basis for DoD’s MIL-STD- 
882 A and B. At this writing, DoD was using version D for its programs. NASA 
later followed the DoD’s system safety approach with a little modification. 
NASA, however, did little to promote the integration of system safety into overall 
systems engineering discipline, as MIL-STD-882 strongly requires. The 
engineers, including safety engineers attempted to bring attention to the Shuttle 
Challenger’s O-ring problem to prevent a catastrophe with no avail. Feynman 
(Leveson, 1999), in his, An Outsider’s Inside View o f  the Challenger Inquiry 
wrote:
“We saw that NASA had no system for fixing the (Shuttle O-ring) problem, even 
though engineers were writing letters like, ‘HELP!’ and ‘This is a RED ALERT!’ 
Nothing was done.”
In 1990’s many other safety documentation emerged. In 1993, the System Safety 
Analysis handbook was published and is now sold in more than 35 countries. 
Journal of system safety came about 1999.
In the year 2000, the MIL-STD-882D replaced the “C” version to account for 
acquisition reform changes and to allow flexibility in implementation or process 
while preserving basic system safety requirements. This version is titled, 
“Standard Practice for System Safety.” The approach contained in this document 
will be explained in paragraph 2.8.1.
2.3.4 System Safety Engineering
For us, the indisputable lesson o f Chernobyl lies in this: the principles regulating 
the further development o f the scientific-technological revolution must be safety, 
discipline, order, and organization. Everywhere and in all respects, we must 
operate according to the strictest standards.
-Mikhail Gorbachev
System Safety Engineering (SSE), an integrated part of Systems Engineering 
(SE), has at its goal, the early detection of hazards so that the controls can be 
designed into the system. Figure 2.12 (Alborzi, 2004) depicts the integration of 
SSE into the SE for optimum design-in safety into the system.
The System Safety Engineering process includes defining the tasks to be 
performed based on the nature and complexity of the system being developed.
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The tasks are different depending on the phase of system development, but the 
early involvement of SSE team is essential. The typical tasks associated with a 
complex system is:
• Develop the System Safety Program Plan
• Identify potential top-level system hazards
• Establish a Hazard Tracking Database and a Closed-Loop Hazard 
Tracking Process
• Identify safety critical components, subsystems and/or interfaces
• Identify Safety Requirements from the system requirements specification
• Perform Safety Requirement Analysis
• Perform Design Analysis
• Perform Code Analysis
• Review and influence the System Test Plan
• Develop safety test procedures
• Verify Safety Requirements via testing
• Review test results
• Document all findings
• Determine the overall residual risk
• Prepare Safety Assessment Report (SAR)
SE
Figure 2.12- SSE- an Integrated part of SE
2.3.5 System Safety Methodology
Currently, there are multiple, but similar SSE processes used for US Navy 
systems. Each process must comply with MIL-STD-882, NAVSEAINST 5000- 
2R (DoD, 2003), or other contractual safety standards.
2.3.6 System Safety Analysis
The following are typical analyses performed in a system safety program:
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• Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
• Sub-System Hazard Analysis (SSHA)
• System Hazard Analysis (SHA)
• Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (Q&SHA)
Safety Analyses are performed to study the root causes of hazards in the system as 
are associated to hardware, software or human, to identify or recommend design
feature for controlling hazards, and to establish a relationship of root causes to
actual mishap.
The above analyses are performed in different phases of system development and 
their output is served as input to further analyses. Other analyses such as Safety 
Requirement Criticality Analysis (SRCA) or Software Hazards Analysis are also 
performed on some programs.
Figure 2.13 shows the relationship between safety analyses and the risk of 
mishap.




; m  L e v e l  
a z a r d  — *
Track ID 
ailure)
M is h a p
(e.g. Inadvertent 
Release of Weapon on 
Friend)
►
E f f e c t











_  3 - J
CAM System Safety
FIGURE 2.13- Safety Analyses and Risk of Mishap Relationship
2.3.7 Analysis Tools 
Fault Tree Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is the most typical and oldest method for analysis. It 
was developed in 1962 by H.A. Watson at Bell Telephone Laboratories to
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evaluate the Minuteman Launch Control System for an unauthorized (inadvertent) 
missile launch (Leveson, 1999). FTA is a top-down analysis of an undesirable 
event. It is the means of identifying the causes of hazards. FTA uses Boolean 
logic (and /or) to show the combination of individual faults that can contribute to 
the top-level event. As the tree branches out and down the tree, the details of the 
root causes are more evident. Both quantitative and qualitative analysis can be 
done with FTA. If the probabilities of occurrences of the events on the tree are 
known, then the frequency of the top event can be determined.








Hazard 2 Hazard 3Hazard 1
SoS level 
Inadvertent Launch
Figure 2.14- Sample Fault Tree Analysis 
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
FMEA is one of the most used analysis tool in safety and reliability. The tool 
allows the engineer to know what can go wrong with each individual piece of the 
hardware (Stephans, 2003).
FMEA takes a system and breaks it down to components and then looks at how 
each individual piece can fail and the effect of each failure on the component and 
on the overall system. Some of the system failures can be both safety related and 
reliability related (Alborzi, 2003). For example, system crashes can decrease the 
reliability of the system, and can also pose safety risk to the assets, equipment or 
cause the corruption of safety critical data. That is why the FMEA and FMECA 
are used for both groups.
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Failure Modes, Effects, and Criticality Analysis (FMECA)
This analysis adds “criticality” to the Failure Modes & Effect Analysis that is 
used widely in reliability world. The criticality is expressed in probabilities or 
frequencies (Leveson, 99). FMECA is the reverse of FTA, that is, it is a bottom- 
top analysis. FMECA will point out interface dependencies and requirements. 
Samuel Keene, (Keene, 1992) gives an example the module will be susceptible to 
conditions from which it cannot recover without an outside system. FMECA is 
the right tool for identification of these dependencies.
Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis
Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis (ETBA) starts with identification of the types 
of energy associated with the system. For each energy type, the points where the 
energy enters is identified and the path of energy flow is traced throughout the 
system. The next step is to identify and evaluate the barriers that are in place to 
control the flow of energy. The evaluation includes the identification of potential 
damages in the event of barriers failure. Next, the risk associated with potential 
damage (as the result of unwanted energy flow (Stephans, 2004), will be 
determined, and expressed in term of risk assessment code (RAC).
The last step is optional and that is the recommendation for improved 
barriers/controls.
2.3.8 Risk Assessment
Risk is measured by merging the effects of two dimensions- the probability of 
occurrence of a mishap, and the severity of the same mishap, if it were to occur.
The Probability dimension has five levels from “frequent” to “improbable” based 
on the criteria chosen in MIL-STD-882 (USN, 2000).
The second dimension is Severity. There are four levels of severity from 
catastrophic to negligible, and the associated criteria (USN, 2000).
Mishap risk is the merging of probability and severity. An example is shown in 
Table 2.2 Table 2.3 shows the authority for acceptance of risk.
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E- Improbable
Table 2.3- The Risk Acceptance Authority
CELLS RISK LEVEL RISK ACCEPTANCE 
AUTHORITY
IA, IB, IC, IIA IIB HIGH Acquisition Executive
ID, IIC, IIIA, IIIB SEROIUS PEO IWS
IE, IID, HE,
m e ,h ie , iv a ,iv b
MEDIUM Program Manager
IVC, IVD, IVE LOW
2.3.9 SOFTWARE SAFETY 
Process Alone Not the Measure of Success
A small number of software components are responsible for a disproportionately 
large number of faults in any large-scale system (Basili, Perricone, 1984). Most 
o f the faults occur are safety related. Chen (Chen, Lang, 1995) notes that 
accidents usually involve a complex interaction of incidents with multiple 
contributing product, process, and people/resource (P3R) factors. This implies 
that we need to find a proper balance of emphasis on P3R issues. Chen’s P3R 
delineation is also illustrated in IEEE standard taxonomy for software engineering 
standards (ANSI/IEEE, 1992). In the Acquisition reform era, in DoD, it has been 
a tendency to emphasize one of the element usually the process, over the other 
elements. This will lead to compromising safety. Littlewood (Littlewood, 1993) 
says it correctly: “There is almost no empirical evidence to confirm that process- 
based standards alone can ensure safety.”
Hamlet and Voas (Hamlet, Voas, 1993) state that there is no direct correlation 
between process and quality of work, specifically,
“All of these ideas, from process definition and control to systematic 
testing have one failing in common: there is no established relationship between 
the method and quantitative assessment of the quality that methods is supposed to 
engender.”
In the early 1990s, the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, Inc., 
(IEEE) Software Engineering Standards Committee (SESC) formed the Software 
Safety Working Group. The group’s charter was to develop a software safety 
standard that described, “The minimum acceptable requirements for the content of 
a software safety plan...which is used for the development procurement,
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maintenance, and retirement of safety critical software (IEEE, 1994). The result 
was IEEE Std. 1228 and was approved in March 1994.
This standard focuses on software safety issues, and recommends that a software 
safety plan be developed as a part of overall system safety program. The goal of 
this standard is, “to address the processes and activities intended to improve the 
safety of safety critical software”(IEEE, 1994).
Software and Uncertainties
Recently, the need to re-use reliable software libraries to interface with legacy 
systems has surfaced few interoperability issues. These issues easily propagate to 
the rest of the systems involved in interoperation. In U.S. Navy systems, when the 
mission involves the risk of human (Gill, 1991), evaluation of the safety of the 
software controlling the system is required. Currently much of the evaluation is 
done manually, therefore costly and error-prone. Fault Tree Analysis done 
traditionally for the hardware, is now being applied to software (Leveson, Harvey, 
1983). The Fault Tree Analysis has been successful since its early development in 
1960s, when first was used for Minuteman missile system (Hammer, 1972).
With the rapid migration to systems of systems architecture, the software 
architecture, that is, the high level description of its computational elements, the 
means by which they interact (Gamble, 2001), and the structural constraints on 
the interaction (Perry, 1992), is of great interest to safety engineers. The software 
re-use and software modification in safety critical code have brought new 
challenges for safety engineers. Several different computer languages, data types 
and requirements are required, for systems in the federation, to be interoperable 
without advert safety implications. The solution is usually bringing new 
middleware to provide a generic and reusable solution to communication conflicts 
(Gamble, 2001). However, the inherent uncertainty associated with software in 
safety critical systems and reconfiguring the systems, becomes a “certain” risk 
that cannot be quantified. If risk could not be quantified, it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to reduce or manage it.
(Leveson, 1999) points to the myth associated with software- a belief that 
software cannot “fail” and that all errors will be removed by testing. On the 
contrary, software can fail and the consequence can be described in accident like 
Arian 3 explosion, as the result of dead code being executed, and MARS probe 
loss as the result of simple unit of measurement discrepancies.
Unfortunately, it takes catastrophic accidents, for the managers and stakeholders, 
to pay attention to software safety and to fund it adequately. One of the main 
reasons why software safety analysis is not funded adequately and as the result, 
not performed well, is the lack of good evidence or data in the benefits it 
provides. The benefits are long term and usually come indirectly, in the form of 
no-accident. Most governmental agencies or industrial agencies are more 
concerned with short-term goals.
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2.3.10 Safety Review Boards
The Navy programs are evaluated, at each critical phase of the development 
lifecycle, by a formal, independent review board (s).
• Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board (WSESRB)
The WSESRB (NAVSEA, 1997) has responsibility for independent 
oversight of the safety effort associated with all ordnance items, weapon devices, 
or systems used, handled, stored or tested aboard a Navy ship or aircraft. The 
WSESRB functions by providing safety-related guidance and recommendations to 
acquisition programs and Milestone Design Authorities (MDA). The WSESRB 
also provides recommendations to MDA regarding safety approval of designs 
entering low-rate initial production (LRIP) and/or prior to final production 
approval for weapon systems, related systems and materials, and weapon system 
software considered for use by the Navy.
The WSESRB consists of representatives from the Naval Systems Commands and 
other Naval activities as deemed appropriate by the chairperson (NAVSEA, 
1997). WSESRB members may seek assistance in technical reviews and may 
request attendance of technical experts at WSESRB meetings, as necessary.
The WSESRB, in general, makes safety recommendations to Program Managers 
(PM) and MDAs (NAVSEA, 1997). In light of compelling requirements, the PM 
or MDA may decide not to comply with the WSESRB’s safety recommendations 
and to accept an increased level of risk associated with an identified hazard 
(NAVSEA, 1997).
• Technical Review Panels (TRP)
A subset of WSESRB, these panels examine the software, or other unique aspects 
of the system. Its recommendations and findings are not final until WSESRB’s 
approval.
2.4 THE “GAP” IN THE LITERATURE
Table 2.2 lists some of the most known and focused literature in areas of:
• System Safety/ Software safety
• Interoperability
• Systems of Systems
2.4.1 The Method for Literature Review
The literature on System Safety and Software Safety were reviewed based on the 
following 5 criteria:
• Single System






If the document applied to any combination of the above, it was checked in this 
table.
As evident in the table, none of the safety documents addressed non-single system 
architecture or interoperability.






If the document applied to any of the criteria or combinations of the criteria, it 
was marked. As evident, none of the literature in this subject addressed “Safety”.






The pool is narrow in this area, but there were enough to conclude that system 
safety was not in the mind of the authors.
Table 2.4 shows clearly that the body of knowledge lacked in one area: Safety 
Interoperability. This is the focus of this research and analysis.












TABLE 2.4- The “Gap” in the Body of Knowledge
AUTHORS Literature on System Safety Literature on Interoperability





Performance Training Testing Safety
1 Herrmann X Y
2 Leveson, N. X X X Y
3 Shimeal/ Gill X Y
4 Roland X X Y
5 Stephans X Y
6 MIL-STD-882 X X Y X X
7 Haimes X X Y
1- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - :- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - r
8 Puett N X
9 Young N X X X
10 Scultz/DISA X
11 B enkhallat/S iebert X
12 Davis/Payton X




16 Correa-Martinez N X




21 Keating N X
22 Phadke X X
23 Flood/Carson X X
24 O’conner X
25 Bar-Yam X
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2.5 SYSTEM SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY- A NEW 
CONCEPT
Up to now, interoperability has been viewed as a “performance” issue (even by 
some safety engineers), and so it is often thought of being outside the scope of 
system safety. Many books and technical papers have been written to explore the 
interoperability aspect of engineering. Some interoperability-friendly tools such 
as Java, CORBA, have been successful in facilitating the integration effort 
between multiple complex systems.
The magnitude of the software safety challenge in today’s interconnected and 
interrelated systems is before us every time we rely on air traffic controllers to get 
us safely from one part of the continent to another part while thousands of other 
airplanes are doing the same thing, at the same time in various directions. Some 
organizations have started to grasp the necessity and the complexity of safety as 
the intrinsic property of interoperable systems. The FBI has recently established a 
National Infrastructure Protection to protect safety-critical systems and software 
(Hermann, 1999). Department of Defense has initiated a broader, more system-of- 
systems-based approach in embedding safety features in the design of the overall 
system architecture.
In U.S. Navy, the idea of a “combat system” in engineering domain (minus the 
system safety) is a familiar term. The integration issues are dealt with and 
resolved. But system safety analyses were always conducted on single systems 
and based on single system view. This practice continued until USS NIMITZ was 
ready to sail as a part of the battle group and needed its Ship Self Defense System 
(SSDS) to get approval from Weapons Systems Explosives Safety Review Board 
(WSESRB.) The WSESRB did not concur with the safety effort on the various 
systems until a new comprehensive, system of systems level safety effort was 
established.
Consequently, in 2002, USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) Ship Self Defense Combat 
System Safety Program launched, for the first time, an initial step toward 
analyzing a combat system (i.e. system of systems) for safety. This “ad hoc” 
approach to system safety was completed when USS NIMITZ sailed in 2002 only 
few months after the safety program initiated (NAVSEA, 2002). More detail on 
USS NIMITZ is provided in 2.8.2 as it is used as an approach for analyzing safe 
interoperability of complex system of systems against the safety interoperability 
criteria in paragraph 2.7.
In 2004, USS REAGAN initiated a more thorough combat system safety analysis 
(NAVSEA, 2004). Lessons-leamed from USS NIMITZ helped in the preliminary 
analysis process. But the program does not have the benefit o f a structured and 
formalized methodology. There is not a model other than USS NIMITZ to follow. 
This effort began earlier and used USS NIMITZ lessons-leamed (NAVSEA, 
2004). But interoperability issues from safety perspective have not been analyzed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
in depth, partially because no framework exists as of yet. Lack of system of 
systems safety engineering methodology precluded, up to this day, the in-depth 
analysis of interoperability issues or even risk assessment. This program is still 
under work and it is in its early lifecycle. The approach used for this program is 
identical to USS NIMITZ, but with more time. Since this safety program is in its 
early phases, and can add no new method /perspective for analysis, it will not be 
used in our comparison and evaluation against safe interoperability criteria.
2.6 SYSTEM SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES
As explained in paragraph 1.5, safety is “Freedom from those conditions that can 
cause death, injury, occupational illness, or damage to or loss of equipment or 
property, or damage to environment” (USN, 2000).
The definition above is an absolute. In practical sense, we will never have 
“freedom” from those hazardous conditions in a complex system. Safety issues 
refer to those conditions, entities, and hazards in the system that, given a “right” 
circumstance, can contribute or lead, directly or indirectly, to an accident. 
Inversely, an issue is safety- related when it can cause a hazardous condition in 
which an undesirable event may occur.
2.6.1 System Safety Interoperability Impediments
Gamble (Gamble, Davis, Payton, 2001) gives a big portion of “credit” for 
interoperability conflicts to software architectural issues. He disputes some of the 
DoD’s steps toward post-integration assessments, mainly because once the 
problems are discovered, there is no time to fix them. He proposes pre-integration 
assessment of the to-be system, mainly based on its software architecture. An 
integrated architecture is a software architecture description of the overall solution 
to interoperability problems between all interacting systems. The objective of pre­
integration conflict assessment is to choose the right middleware.
The requirement for interoperability between complex systems that were 
developed independently, without the requirement for interaction, introduces a 
few challenges. How do we resolve the different computer languages used in 
these systems? How do we resolve modeling differences in data used in these 
systems?
As shown in Figure 2.6 Young (Young, 2002) explains that the modeling problem 
is one of the biggest impediments to interoperability. Each system in the 
federation of systems has a different ‘understanding’ or a ‘model’ of a tank. 
Some of these modeling differences used in the Navy’s complex systems also 
carry great safety implications. We need to understand the sources for these 
differences and learn how to mitigate them in the system design.
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The root causes for differences is explained in paragraph 2.2.1. The paragraph 
also lists and describes the several heterogeneities that have been noted by the 
researchers. Here, we choose those heterogeneities that carry safety implications 
and focus on safetyness of the heterogeneities.
Heterogeneity of Hardware and Operating Systems
These are differences in operating systems and the hardware used when new, 
legacy or hybrid complex systems are integrated. The speed in technology 
advances makes this problem a certain one in a federation of systems. The 
hardware platform differences include how the same information is displayed in 
different systems, such as the size, length, and format of the data. The differences 
in operating systems have been a more “familiar” problem. In DoD, the two most 
utilized operating systems in the world of COTS are Microsoft Window and 
UNIX products.
Heterogeneity of Structure
This modeling difference refers to differences in structural composition, schema, 
or implied vs. explicitly stated information. Young, (Young, 2002) explains that 
this difference can arise when a real-world entity is modeled as an object on one 
system and as attribute in another, e.g. such as an aircraft route being modeled as 
an attribute of an aircraft mission object on one system (as one element of the 
overall mission) and as a separate entity used for de-conflicting missions in 
another (Holowczak, 1996). It will be shown later that “de-confliction” is a safety 
critical issue.
The heterogeneity of structure also refers to concepts being modeled differently in 
the schemas of corresponding systems, e.g. a relationship that is modeled as one 
to one in one schema and one-to many in another (Hammer, McLeod, 1999). This 
type of mismatch is especially apparent in IFF interrogation tasks. IFF processing 
is noted later in this section as a safety related issue.
Heterogeneity of Presentation
This heterogeneity includes domain mismatch problems. For example, the use of 
different units of measure, difference in precision, disparate data type, word size 
and constraints integrity. From this list only precision is not safety critical. 
Domain mismatch occurs problems occur when the same concept is characterized 
differently in two separate systems (Young, 2002), such as geographic position 
measured in latitude and longitude on one system and Military Grid Reference 
System (MGRS) on another (Hammer, McLeod, 1999). Another example is for a 
system to use meter as a unit for distance measurement, and another system to use 
yards. Disparate data types refer to expression of the same characteristic in 
different data types, for example, using a telephone number as an integer in one 
system and as a character string in another (Young, 2002).
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Heterogeneity of Temporal Validity
This modeling difference arises from differences in the time used by two models 
to observe or record the state of a real-world entity (Young, 2002). These 
temporal validity issues are particularly an issue with military C4I systems 
(Holowczak, 1996, Wiederhold, 1993). For example in one C4I system, the 
satellite picture of a threat area may be kept for a month to be valid (and be used), 
and the same picture in another system may kept for a year to be valid (and used). 
Validity of this real-world entity may have further implications depending on how 
it is used.
2.6.2 Top System Safety Interoperability Issues 
Issue of Identification Friend or Foe (IFF)
Identification systems are used in every aircraft and every ship, civilian or 
military. Pre-set codes within various modes are agreed upon between the friendly 
units (Ikram, 1998). The unit is challenged, and if the incoming unit responds 
correctly to the pre-set codes, it is considered a friendly. If not, the unit is 
considered “hostile” and further actions will be taken against this unit.
The safety issue arises when a discrepancy in identification, that is mis- 
identification or no identification, can lead to prosecution of a unit that may very 
well be a friendly. Unofficial DoD estimate is that 24% of U.S. fatalities in 1990- 
91 Gulf War were caused by friendly fire. Reed (Reed, Little, 1992) states that in 
Dessert Storm experiences involving highly mobile close support operations, were 
one where the inability to IFF ground targets such as men and small vehicles 
caused several incidents of fratricide. Different and multiple identification 
systems used in the theater also accounts for some safety issues. The 
identification given to a target by system X and passed to system Y, does not 
match with the identification on the same target processed by system Y. 
Cooperative Engagement Processor’s (CEP), a component of Cooperative 
Engagement capability (CEC), main task is to correlate track ID’s and track IFF 
modes and to pass that final-correlated, comprehensive view of a target to all 
requesting systems. GEO DB information is used in CEC for situational 
awareness and composite identification function. Potential ID differences exist if  
one system has a different version of DB than another system in the combat 
system (CS) or in other platforms. Potential engagement of a Friend or Non- 
Hostile may occur.
Recall paragraph 1.3.1, “6 April 2003; an USAF A-10 kills one British soldier and injures 
several in a friendly fire incident in southern Iraq” (CALL, 2004).”
Also, the U.S. Navy has recently implemented an upgrade in its AEGIS computer 
programs to account for modification made in UPX-XII.
The Interrogator System, AN/UPX-29(V) is an Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) 
System compliant with requirements for an Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon 
System (ATCRBS) IFF Mark XII System (AIMS). Mark XII requirements have 
been modified to include Mode 5 capabilities that together with the current Mark
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XII requirements make up Mark XIIA. The AN/UPX-29(V) will be upgraded to 
provide Mark XIIA (Mode 5) and Mode S capability. The secure Mode 5 employs 
a new waveform, time dependent interrogations, and new cryptography. It also 
provides the capability of transponders to downlink to the interrogation platform 
the standard Mark XII Selective Identification Feature (SIF) modes, a unique 
Platform Identification Number (PIN), National Origin (NO), and Mission Codes 
(MC). Mode S is the civilian upgrade to the standard Mode 3 and C interrogation 
and replies. Mode S provides the capability to selectively request and receive 
specific register data such as Global Positioning System (GPS) position, aircraft 
type, and VHF radio frequencies for an aircraft.
Additionally, included in the changes is the expansion of Mode 1 from two-digit 
octal to four-digit octal. It is called extended Mode 1.
In order to maintain interoperability between the Mode 5 and Mode S capable 
Aegis ships and non-Mode 5 and non-Mode S participating units over the Link, 
Command and Decision (CND) will not override an extended Mode 1 code with a 
Mode 1 code or a non-enhanced Mode 1 codes. Modes 2, 3, and 4 are legacy 
codes.
Prosecution of a friendly track based on erroneous IFF reply can have a 
catastrophic consequence. It is apparent that this change, and any other IFF data 
passed between systems is a safety critical issue in the interoperability 
requirement.
Inability to distinguish Training/Test Tracks from Tactical Tracks
Recall the accident noted in paragraph 1.3.1,
“ 17 April 2002; four Canadian soldiers are killed and eight wounded when a 
USAF F-16 mistakenly bombed them as the Canadians were engaging in a live- 
fire training exercise at night” (CALL, 2003).
When complex systems of systems are integrated and interrelated to perform joint 
execution of tasking, it is imperative that they all are aware when one or more 
systems are in training, test or maintenance mode and that tracks being tracked 
and managed are simulated and not real. The separation of training and test tracks 
from tactical tracks by design enables all link units to distinguished between the 
two types and not try to engage a track that doesn’t exist. Causal factors related to 
confusion can be either:
• No integrated training capability in one of the systems,
• No effective communication,
• No use for simulated data by a system therefore everything is Real, or
• Residual training tracks after mode transition.
Break Engage / Hold Fire / Cease Fire
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Break Engage capability allows operators to stop an unsafe engagement. The 
engagement is stopped and all engagement related information is cleared from 
engagement queue.
Hold Fire capability allows the operator to stop the engagement but retain all 
engagement related information in engagement queue.
Cease Fire capability allows the operator to continue with the operation of a 
Missile in Flight (MIF) and with a battery-activated missile, but no more firing is 
permitted.
Inability to break engage or failure to break engage/hold fire can have 
catastrophic consequences. This is usually due to console failure (loss of VAB 
Array), loss of interface between systems during engagement. Casual factors such 
as processing delay and corrupted engagement data can cause this safety issue to 
occur (Alborzi, 2004).
Engagement Status is a sub-issue where operator confusion may lead to an 
improper action. These status problems include a) Wrong status of engagement 
displayed as the result of malfunction of display system or timing between break 
engage and previous engage status did not allow for correct status display.
System Crash
Tools that observe and manipulate the runtime behavior of parallel and distributed 
systems are essential for developing and maintaining these systems. But the 
infrastructure requirements must be in place to support run-time tools, otherwise 
there is no interoperability or there is an interoperability that causes system 
crashes or system malfunction. In a war-fighting system, a system crash can be 
catastrophic due to loss of interface with the weapon in flight.
One of the issues, the “premature launch” (Alborzi, 2004) is explained in detail to 
show the safety criticality of the issue.
Pre-Mature Missile Launch
There are occasions when a low risk element level hazard may have greater safety 
implications when considered in the Systems of Systems context. As depicted in 
the simplified illustration below (Figure 2.15), the Weapon Control System 
(WCS) interfaces with the launcher system and launcher in turn interfaces directly 
with the missile.
The WCS has a requirement to issue Flight Target Data (FTD) to the launcher 
system when requested by the launcher and all validation checks within the WCS 
are verified. For example, the WCS will ensure that the missile is selected for 
launch, the proper mode has been achieved, and the message from the launcher is 
in the proper format and can be processed.
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The launcher has requirements to request the FTD when it is required during the 
launch sequence, validate the data received from the WCS, transmit the FTD to 
the missile and monitor for a Ready To Launch (RTL) indication from the missile 
indicating that the FTD has been received and validated by the missile, and the 
missile has performed a health and status check and is ready for launch. Upon 
receipt, the launcher then commands ignition of the missile’s rocket motor and 
monitors for a missile away indication.
Missile requirements are to validate and process the FTD received from the 
launcher. Once FTD is processed and the health status has been determined ready 
to support the launch, the missile initiates a health and status checkout of the 
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Figure 2.15 -  An Example of Safety Interoperability Issue
Now consider that there is a known hazard in the missile system whereby the 
missile sends the Ready to Launch (RTL) signal before it has fully processed the 
FTD and performed the health and status check. The hazard assessment 
determines this is a low risk missile hazard in as much as the impact is negligible 
and the probability is remote (10'3>P>10'6). However, the consequences of this 
hazard coming to fruition are more significant from a system of systems 
perspective.
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Given the occurrence of the hazard in the missile, that is the missile sends the 
RTL signal to the launcher before it has fully processed the FTD and performed a 
health and status check, the launcher will validate the RTL and immediately 
command missile ignition. This will result in the missile launching prematurely, 
without having the requisite data to know where it is to fly; i.e. the missile is 
flying blind. The consequences could be catastrophic.
Another example of safety interoperability issue was provided in paragraph 1.5 to 
facilitate the understanding of safety interoperability concept.
Table 2.5 summarizes the safety interoperability issues identified as the result of 
literature review.












Table 2.5- Safety Interoperability Issues
Safety Issues Sub-Issues Causal factor(s)
1 Air Control Sending the air controlled A/C toward Target. 
No notification to A/C on imminent firing
Link problems
2 Deconfliction Operator Confusion
Duplication of operation Timing, location codes
Friendly Fire
Damage by Target penetration 
Accidents
3 Distinction of 
Real Tracks from 
Simulated
Residual training tracks in tactical mode 
Misidentifying a training track from Real 
Inability to distinguish between Tactical and Training 
tracks
No integrated Training 
capability
No robust communication 
No use for Simulated data by a 







Failure to Break Engage/ Hold Fire
Inability to Break Engage/Hold Fire
System is in Engaged status, but display doesn’t show






Break engage, hold fire, not
working
Timing












6 Identification ID Inaccuracy 
ID Doctrine 
ID Differences 
ID MGMT and Conflict 




Geographic DB versions 
Interrogation problems, wrong 
pre-selected ID




Inability to communicate 
No multiple mode capability 
Display Mode problems
8 Premature Weapon flying Blind Timing delay
Launch Engage friendly Loss of interface
9 Reference Points Ownship Interface/communication
Anomalies Other areas/tracks Track data corruption
10 Threat Evaluation Threat values
Threat Evaluation Process LAW weapons doctrine
Auto engagement doctrine can 
result in release of ordnance w/o 
operator initiation




Redundant Local tracks 
Excessive TN Changes
Different systems using 





Table 2.5- Safety Interoperability Issues- continued
67
2.7 CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF SAFE 
INTEROPERABILITY ANALYSIS APPROACHES
In order to elect a systemic analysis approach to evaluate the safety of the 
interoperation between multiple complex systems, we need to establish a list of 
criteria for evaluation. By carefully assessing each approach against the criteria, 
we can optimize the quality of our analysis from system safety perspective. Based 
on the safety interoperability issues identified above, the author of dissertation has 
identified the top 6 safety related criteria (A thru F) for evaluation. Each criterion 
will be discussed briefly in this section.
A: SoS-based
B: Address of Model Correlation
C: Knowledge /Safety Requirements of Remote Operations (interfaces)
D: Feedback (validation Verification) Capability
E: Translation Methodology (messages, representation of entities, etc.)
F: Safe Federation Extensibility Capability
SoS-based: The approach used for analysis must be based on systems of
systems context. Single-based approaches are unable to address the safety 
implications, nature and/or the requirements for interoperation between multiple 
complex systems that need to be logically and functionally integrated and 
interoperable.
Address of Model Correlation: The approach chosen for analysis must address 
modeling differences and resolutions/mitigations for differences. Developing a 
federation of autonomously developed heterogeneous systems involves many 
real-world entities and potentially many models of those entities by the many 
systems (Young, 2002). Manual correlation of different models of each real-world 
entity could be difficult, unsafe, and time-consuming effort. In integrating 
database systems, the data correlation problem poses one of the biggest safety 
issues. Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program uses Geo-base data 
for track / ID correlation. Safety issues related to track correlation account for top 
ten percent of CEC’s safety hazards.
The candidate analysis approach will be evaluated against this criterion for safe 
interoperability purpose.
Knowledge / Requirements of Remote Operations (interfaces): An approach 
to analysis of safe interoperability capability must be able to address interface 
requirements. First is the knowledge or awareness of the existence or identity of 
those systems with which it communicates. Generally, filter in the pipe (Gamble, 
2001) and filter architectural style are unaware whereas object-oriented 
architecture is aware. These requirements include knowledge of interfacing
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systems’ functionalities, a mechanism by which each system in SoS can “talk” 
and “be understood” by other systems, and receive data. This mechanism enables 
a system within a federation to invoke operations implemented on another 
systems. Safe-invoking operations is the criterion for analysis approaches. Safe- 
invoking approach of safety critical command of other systems in the federation is 
essential for the safe operation of the overall system of systems. Loss of safety 
critical interface falls in this criterion. For example loss of uplink data to the 
Missile in Flight (MIF) is safety critical issue because Missile uses the uplink data 
to guide itself toward the target. Not having the uplink data as the result of 
interface loss leads to the MIF flying blindly, therefore causing a catastrophic 
accident.
The candidate analysis approaches will be evaluated to determine how the 
safeguards been designed in their remote callings methods (i.e. using a designer 
who has prior knowledge of other systems operations, or invoking a server’s 
methods using the client’s representation for the method name and parameters) 
(Young, 2002). Also, the approach will be evaluated on the basis o f sound and 
unambiguous safety requirements for interface operations.
Feedback (Validation & Verification) Capability: The next criterion is that the 
candidate analysis approach must address each system’s need and capability to 
give feedback to other systems in the federation, to validate the safety critical 
messages as for their format, their content, their size, their acceptable boundaries, 
etc., and verify that they can be used for operations. It must also address the 
mechanism by which erroneous information is returned to sender without causing 
corruption or malfunction of the receiving system. Erroneous information include 
incomplete messages, formatting problem, or “not-understandable’ information. 
The feedback capability is more than a “hand-shake” capability; it verifies that a 
message can be processed (used) in the receiving system. The analysis approach 
must allow for managing interfaces by listing and documenting controls, 
dependencies, and data objects across the interfaces. Input errors are checked in 
real time (Keene, 1992).
Translation Methodology: Early interoperability attempts involved the creation 
of custom point-to-point (also known as source-to-destination) interfaces between 
systems (Young, 2002). This approach was to resolve representational differences 
between multiple complex systems, potentially requires n(n-l) translation for a 
federation of n systems. That is if there were 4 systems in the federation, we 
needed to have 12 translations.
Employing a platform-independent approach in determining the translations 
during a two-step conversion requires 2(n) translations. In the same example of a 
4 systems-federation, the number of translations will be 8. This method is not 
only more efficient and more productive in terms of cost and memory 
consumptions, but the safety integrity of safety critical data transmitted between 
systems increases with less translations, i.e. with 2-step method. Candidate
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approaches will be evaluated based on which method is used or is addressed 





Figure 2.16- n(n-l) Translation Figure 2.17- 2(n) Translation
Safe Federation Extensibility Capability: This capability refers both to 
computer languages used in the systems and to extensibility of the federation in 
terms of additions to the federation.
• A program is considered extensible if enhancements can be made to an 
existing component or data structure without adversely impacting the 
dependent entities. Dependent entities are those components that interact 
with original entity. A federation is safe-extensible when enhancements 
can be made to an existing component or data structure without 
compromising (or affecting) the designed-in safeguards in the dependent 
entities.
• A federation is considered extensible when additional systems can be 
added to the federation and changes can be made to information and 
interfaces among systems without adversely affecting interoperation of the 
original system federation. A federation is safe-extensible when 
additional systems can be added to the federations and changes can be 
made to information and interface among systems without adversely 
affecting the designed-in safeguards in the interoperations of the original 
system federation.
This safe federation extensibility provides the foundation for federation reuse 
(new upgrades, etc.) without concerns regarding safety critical data being 
impacted.
Candidate analysis approaches are compared to determine the level of support 
provided for creating an extensible system safely. If an approach meets one of the 
safe-extensibility support requirements, then it is considered partial support. If it 
meets neither support requirement, or meets one or both criteria with affecting or 
compromising safety, it is considered to provide no safe federation extensibility 
capability.
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2.8 CURRENT APPROACHES TO ANALYZING SYSTEM 
SAFETY / INTEROPERABILITY
2.8.1 MIL-STD-882D APPROACH
MIL-STD-882D requires the System Safety Program (SSP) to establish a System 
Safety Working Group (SSWG) (USN, 2000). The SSWG is chaired by Principle 
For Safety (PFS) who is designated to oversee the entire phases of SSP, and to 
report the residual risk in the system to the stakeholder. The working group has a 
responsibility to define its interfacing IPTs and to establish an integrated working 
relationship with the rest of Systems Engineering teams.
In a typical single system level safety engineering (SSE) process, the safety 
engineer’s or SSWG’s interactions are concurrent with the rest of the 
development team. This SSE is not conducted in isolation, but parallel and to 
some extent integrated with the system engineering activities. Figure 2.18 shows 










SW reuse ^  /  Safety




Figure 2.18- System Safety Working Group Interactions/ Interfaces
System Safety Process
MIL-STD-882 serves as guidance document for U.S. Navy System Safety 
Programs. Therefore it does not specify a process for system safety analyses. Each 
contractor or design agent can use its own process within the guidelines and the 
requirements of MIL-STD-882.
This general process, mentioned in paragraph 2.3.5, was developed in early 
1970’s to guide the new safety engineers in identifying and mitigating hazardous 
conditions in the system. Since the safety engineering effort concentrated on the 
single system with known input, known output and clear functionalities, this 
process was able to ensure an acceptable level of safety for DoD’s war-fighting
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systems. However, neither MIL-STD-882 nor other early founders foresaw the 
coming of system of systems architecture and battle-group-wide combat 
operations. Therefore the process and safety activities required for development 
of DoD’s war-fighting systems did not include interoperation with other systems 
based on holistic systemic view.
Hazard Risk Assessment
MIL STD-882D provides guidance to assessing system risks. Two qualitative and 
quantitative factors play a major role in determining the risk- one is severity and 
the other is probability of the mishap occurrence.
Severity - Mishap severity categories are defined to provide a qualitative measure 
of the most reasonable credible mishap resulting from personnel error, 
environmental conditions, design inadequacies, procedural deficiencies, or 
system, subsystem, or component failure or malfunction. Suggested mishap 
severity categories are shown in Table 2.6 (USN, 2000).









Could result in death, permanent total disability, loss 
exceeding $1M, or irreversible severe environmental 
damage that violates law or regulation.
Critical II Could result in permanent partial disability, injuries or 
occupational illness that may result in hospitalization of at 
least three personnel, loss exceeding $200K but less than 
$1M, or reversible environmental damage causing a 
violation of law or regulation.
Marginal III Could result in injury or occupational illness resulting in I 
one or more lost work days(s), loss exceeding $10K but 
less than $200K, or mitigatable environmental damage 
without violation of law or regulation where restoration 
activities can be accomplished.
Negligibl
e
IV Could result in injury or illness not resulting in a lost 
work day, loss exceeding $2K but less than $10K, or 
minimal environmental damage not violating law or 
regulation.
These mishap severity categories provide guidance to a wide variety of 
programs. However, every program based on its size, complexity level, and 
management judgment, can make adjustments to this table. The mutual
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understanding and agreement between the Program Manager and the Design 
Agent is required before the definitions are applied. Other risk assessment 
techniques may be used.
Probability - Mishap probability is the probability that a mishap will occur 
during the planned life expectancy of the system. It can be described in terms of 
potential occurrences per unit of time, events, population, items, or activity. A 
sample qualitative mishap probability levels are shown in Table 2.7 (USN, 2000).
Table 2.7- Suggested Mishap Probability Levels
Descriptio
n*
Level Specific Individual Item Fleet or 
Inventory**
Frequent A Likely to occur often in the 
life of an item, with a 
probability of occurrence 
greater than 10'1 in that life.
Continuously
experienced.
Probable B Will occur several times in 
the life of an item, with a 
probability of occurrence 
less than 10'1 but greater 
than 10'2 in that life.
Will occur 
frequently.
Occasional C Likely to occur some time 
in the life of an item, with a 
probability of occurrence 
less than 10'2 but greater 
than 10‘3 in that life.
Will occur several 
times.
Remote D Unlikely but possible to 
occur in the life of an item, 
with a probability of 
occurrence less than 10'3 
but greater than 10'6 in that 
life.
Unlikely, but can I 
reasonably be j 
expected to occur. I
Improbable E So unlikely, it can be 
assumed occurrence may 
not be experienced, with a 
probability of occurrence 
less than 10'6 in that life.
Unlikely to occur, 1 
but possible.
*Defmitions of descriptive words may have to be modified based on quantity 
of items involved.
**The expected size of the fleet or inventory should be defined prior to accomplishing 
an assessment of the system.
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Risk classification based on mishap severity and mishap probability can be 
performed by using a mishap risk assessment matrix. This assessment allows one 
to assign a mishap risk assessment value to a hazard based on its mishap severity 
and its mishap probability. This value is then used to rank different hazards as to 
their associated mishap risks.
Evaluation of Safe interoperability Analysis Approach
In this section, the MIL-STD-882D system safety approach is evaluated against 
the criteria we established in paragraph 2.7. The result of comparison is 
summarized in Table 2.8.




SoS-based No This standard was intended and designed for 
single-system safety program. The system of 
systems operational environment is not 
addressed by analysis/ tasks requirements.
Address of Model 
Correlation
Partial Model correlation for entities at component level 






Yes Interface operations at system level are analyzed 




Partial Validation and verification of messages 
transmitted to and from the single system is 




No Lack of system of systems approach precludes 





No Only changes to a single program are addressed 
via PHA and SHA and SSHA.
As shown in Table 2.8, the MIL-STD-882D’s approach in analyzing safety 
interoperability requirements is not adequate. Since the standard does not cover 
the SoS architectural environment, the system problems with safety impact are not 
addressed as being part of the analyses. MIL-STD-882D is “partially” 
responsive, because most of safety critical issues can be mitigated thru at the 
single-system level, but interoperability issues with safety impact cannot not be 
addressed by the use of this approach.
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2.8.2 USSNIMITZ APPROACH
As explained in paragraph 2.5, USS NIMITZ (CVN 68) Ship Self Defense 
Combat System Safety Program launched in 2002, for the first time, an initial step 
toward analyzing a combat system (i.e. system of systems) for safety. Since the 
requirement for a comprehensive system safety effort came near deployment, 
there was not much time to implement a well-thought-of system safety program. 
A Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) was done to identify the system of systems 
hazards, their causal factors, and their relationships to the other systems in the 
federation (NAVSEA, 2002). No System Hazard Analysis (SHA), or Safety 
Assessment Report (SAR) on the Combat system level was performed. The risk 
of combat system was not assessed due to lack of methodology for assessment. 
Instead, the risk associated with each hazard in the Combat System Element 
(CSE) element was given to the same hazard that posed a safety risk at the overall 
combat system.
Evaluation of Safe interoperability Analysis Approach
Table 2.9 shows the evaluation of USS NMITZ System Safety Analysis approach 
against the evaluation criteria.




SoS-based Yes The combat system safety program was based on 
system of systems operational environment. This 
was the first CSSP in its kind to view the combat 
system as one large system and conduct a 
“limited” system safety analyses.
Address of Model 
Correlation
Partial Model correlation for entities at CSE level is 
addressed. No analysis or verification tests was 
made as to its accurate implementations of 
resolutions due to lack of safety analyses such as 






Partial Although system level interfaces with other 
systems were defined as to their existence and to 
their safety criticality, no analysis were done to 
verify that safety requirements have been 
implemented successfully and that all failure 
modes have been controlled. No SHA was done 
for CS due to program scheduling issues. Safety 
requirements were not traced to safety critical 
interfaces/functions. Additionally, the safety 
requirement identification was limited to each 
subsystem, i.e. within the scope of single system.





Partial Although safety critical messages going across 
the interfaces were identified during the CSE 
SSP, no analyses or verification was made at CS 
level due to Program Scheduling issues. This 
verification would have been documented in 




Partial The traditional method is 2-step, that is 2(n) 
methodology, which is a safe method for 
message conversion. But no verification 





Partial Changes to software or to the configuration can 
be made, but in the absence of a system of 
systems engineering methodology, each CSE 
will have to use the traditional SE to make 
changes.
Based on the results above, it is clear that this approach is inadequate to meet the 
needs of a SoS level safety program.
2.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this section, the current literature was reviewed for its relevance to this 
research. Since the topic being researched has basis on three categories of 
literature, that is, Systems of Systems environment, Interoperability, and System 
Safety, all three categories were reviewed for their relevance. The system safety 
works included software safety review.
As part of this review, the gap in the literature was identified. In addition, the 
safety interoperability issues were identified for later use in analysis of AEGIS 
Ballistic Missile Defense 3.0 Program.
The safety interoperability concept was introduced and the issues having safety 
implications were addressed. In paragraph 2.7, the criteria for safe interoperability 
capability is developed and provided. The criteria will be used to evaluate the 
current and the proposed approach to analyzing the safe interoperability in the 
Navy’s complex combat systems.
In paragraph 2.8 the current approaches to analyzing the interoperability issues 
with safety implications were addressed. There were two approaches that have 
been used to date—one is MIL-STD-882 and the other approach used for USS 
NIMITZ. The latter approach was an ‘ad hoc’ modification and/or deviation from 
the first approach. These two approaches were evaluated against the criteria in 
paragraph 2.7 to demonstrate their adequacy in analyzing the safety critical
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interoperability issues in combat systems. As stated in each case, the approaches 
did not fully meet the criteria established in paragraph 2.7.
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CHAPTER III
SYSTEM SAFETY INTEROPERABILITY FRAMEWORK 
(SSIF)
“The defense that a hazard was not foreseen is not available to those who do not 
use expertise appropriate to their profession. ”
-Justice Jackson, 1953
3.1 INTRODUCTION
As noted in Chapter I, the purpose of this research is to develop a framework to 
assist in studying the interoperability issues of complex systems of systems from 
system safety standpoint. The objective of Systems Safety Engineering is to, .. 
ensure that safety consistent with mission requirements is designed into 
systems...” (USN, 2000). Mission requirements, for the Navy’s complex systems 
o f systems, are to interoperate and perform joint tasks operations. Joint tasks 
operation means the capability of one system to employ the services of another 
system. These services represent the behavior of real-world entities modeled by 
the owner-system. And since these systems were developed independently, in 
different times, with different requirements, by different manufacturer, they will 
most certainly be modeling those system behaviors in different ways. In Chapter 
II, we discussed the impediments to interoperability, and we stated that the 
modeling differences were on top of the list, and some of these differences had 
associated safety impact.
In addition, system safety issues in interoperability were identified in Chapter II. 
These issues, although part of performance domain, have safety implication. The 
failure of a safety critical function is of great concern for a safety engineer, 
especially in the new environment such as system of systems where the stakes are 
higher, and the lines of boundaries are ambiguous, and the system problems are 
fluid and more complex.
3.2 SYSTEM SAFETY- A DIMENSION OF 
INTEROPERABILITY
As stated in Chapter II, interoperability, so far, has not been viewed as having any 
connection to safety. It has been viewed primarily as a performance issue. Even 
some safety engineers share that opinion. The idea of safety as a dimension of 
interoperability is puzzling to many. For many, system safety is synonymous with 
occupational safety or personnel safety only, and no interoperability issue seems 
to fit that concept. Advancing system thinking in system safety engineering by
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
78
categorizing system safety, as a dimension of interoperability is one of the 
significant by-products and contributions of this research.
The following is the list of various dimensions of interoperability that have 
emerged in engineering, and have been “communicated” to the engineering world.
• Performance interoperability is the ability of the systems to perform 
system operations, exchange information, and achieve the ultimate 
mission requirement in an effective manner. As a part of this dimension, 
the interoperability of database systems is a major player since the systems 
will be using available database information for operations.
• Training interoperability refers to being able to train across multiple 
systems, perhaps across different platforms and, within the training 
program, being able to jointly perform tasks.
• Security interoperability is another aspect of interoperability that has been 
getting increased attention. Its primary focus is access control and 
integrity of data classification. Do those who have access or who want 
access to other systems have a “need to know” requirement? Is the 
integrity of information passed among systems monitored? Are the 
information we pass to other systems to conduct certain types of actions 
secure? Encryption capability is used almost always to enhance the 
security interoperability of the systems.
• Testing interoperability refer to coordinated testing effort to verify that the 
hardware, middleware, operating environments and the software are able 
to interoperate. In this area, the architectural integration requirements are 
tested and the focus is on the hardware and environmental issues as 
opposed to software functional operations. This testing is sometimes 
called “conformance” testing and it is referred to checking the 
conformance of the entity to a profile and its normal operation and to 
detect errors. A profile is defined by the standard used in each layer of the 
OSI model. The process and methods of conformance testing must be in 
accordance with ISO 099646 (ISO, 1987). This testing overlaps with the 
performance testing in that it tests for capability of the system, the 
behavior and interconnections.
• Communication/ Information interoperability refers to the ability of 
different communications systems to be used for the interoperability of 
different systems. Message traffic in most network-based systems is based 
on message services that enable the exchange of information between 
applications (Benkhellat, Siebert, and Thomasse, 1993). In DoD, Link 11, 
16 are typical media for systems to interoperate (from communication 
perspective.) Among the different physical communication systems, there 
is multilingual conversion systems that different services or allies in battle
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group can use to communicate and interoperate together using their native 
language.
• The forgotten dimension is system safety. System safety interoperability 
refers to the ability of the Federation system to perform its mission 
requirement without posing a safety risk to personnel, equipment (includes 
weaponry, the ship, other assets) and the environment.

















Figure 3.1- System Safety- A Dimension of Interoperability
3.3 SAFETY CHALLENGES ASSOCIATED WITH SOS
As stated in Chapter II, currently all complex Navy war-fighting systems are 
required to have a system safety program (SSP) by which the hazards of the 
system are identified, eliminated and/or controlled to an acceptable level.
In compliance with NAVSEAINST 8020.6D (NAVSEA, 1997), the SSE is an 
integrated component of SE (see Figure 3.2). The integration means that not only 
that the conduct of SSE tasks will be concurrent with the program development, 
but safety will be an integral part of the “criteria” on which the effectiveness of a 
functional element of the program is measured during the decision makings, 
development, coding and testing and analysis. Safety critical requirements and 
functions are identified and disseminated throughout development team to be used
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for safe implementation of design. Safety engineer interfaces with the design and 





Figure 3.2- SSE an Integral Part of SE
In a tactical System of Systems (SoS) environment, however, the mechanism by 
which the safety SSP can be engineered and produced does not exist. The 
challenges facing system safety are:
• Lack of Standards. These are Specifications that can govern the SoS 
level Safety Program.
• Lack of SoSSE- SoS Safety Engineering (SoSSE) is in its conceptual 
level of creation at this writing. The current SSE is inadequate to address 
the non-linearity of today’s developments. It is also inadequate in 
addressing the safety features for interoperations between systems through 
design.
• Lack of SoSSE Methodology- No methodology exists at this writing to 
support the engineering and design of safety critical features for safety 
critical systems. The methodology, when developed, must be in concert 
and harmony with SoSE. The methodology must address interoperability 
requirements, and must be flexible and adaptive.
• Lack of adaptable/software-focused analysis tools- FTA does not seem 
to respond adequately to identification of software safety issues in SoS 
level. No analysis methods exist to analyze the safety interoperability of 
the system. Also no analysis tool exists to analyze the safety robustness of 
the SoS. The manual analysis on these areas is resource-intensive and 
error-prone.
• Lack of overall SoS safety interoperability framework to be used in 
guiding the SoSSE program for the Navy’s combat systems.
As a part of this research, a framework (called System Safety Interoperability 
Framework) within which an analysis of SoS could be conducted is developed 
and provided. The System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) will be the 
focus of discussion in this chapter.
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3.4 SSIF CHARACTERIZATION
System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) is designed to serve as a high- 
level philosophical and conceptual framework by which a system safety program 
for system of systems environment is established. The framework intends to be 
flexible in adapting to specific requirements of the meta-system, and also 
adaptable to the fluid nature of system of systems engineering challenges.
Characterization Attributes
The SSIF characterization attributes are those attributes that make up (or 
characterize) the essence of SSIF. These are:
• SoS- System of Systems
• SoSE- System of Systems Engineering
• SoSSE- System of Systems Safety Engineering
• SCD- Safety Critical Data
As a part of the research methodology, SSIF was reviewed and validated by three 
subject matter experts. The validation and approval of SSIF by the three subject- 
matter experts are in Appendix B of this dissertation along with the expert- 
election process and a short biography of each expert. The validation of the 
experts attest to the potentiality it demonstrates for its soundness in being 
implemented in analysis of AEGIS BMD program.
Spiral Characterization Attributes
Although, the attributes are listed and explained separately, one after the other, in 
reality and at work, they are overlapping and spiral in nature; they are not 
separate, linear or isolated. To further explain this, SCD analysis will be in 
majority of SoSSE’s activities such as, robust analysis, safety interoperability 
analysis, safety integrity analysis, etc. Moreover, the activities within SoSSE will 
be spiral as well; that means the safety integrity analysis will overlap with safety 
interoperability analysis and that will overlap with software analysis, etc. SoSE 
will include SoSSE verification and validation, etc. The SoS existence is the 
precursor to all other attributes, and so on.
Figure 3.3 displays this spiral relationship.
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Figure 3.3- Spiral Characterization Attributes
SSIF is presented in Figure 3.4. In the following sections, each SSIF 
characterization attribute will be discussed in detail.
















Platform MPlatform NSE SE
Figure 3.4- System Safety Interoperability Framework
SE: Systems Engineering 
SCD: Safety Critical Data 
SSE: System Safety Engineering
SoS: System of Systems
SoSE: System of Systems Engineering
SoSSE: System of Systems Safety Engineering
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3.4.1 SoS
It is important to remember that all discussions on SoS are limited to U.S. Navy’s 
combat systems. When two or more independent, autonomous complex systems 
are integrated and interconnected as one larger system to perform a higher level of 
mission requirement, the result is a system of systems. In Figure 3.5 below:
System A is an autonomous, complex system, e.g. a sensor system, installed in 
platform M. This system was developed under traditional SE and had been 
analyzed for safety via SSE, and therefore the hazards in the systems had been 
identified, eliminated or controlled during development.
System B is another complex, autonomous system that was developed through the 
traditional SE under separate requirements, and is now being modified or 
reconfigured to integrate with System A. System B is installed in platform N. This 
system has also been evaluated for safety under SSE at the time it was developed. 
It is fair to assume that system-wide hazards have been resolved through the SSE.
System C, another complex autonomous system, e.g. a missile system, has been 
also developed through its own SE process and had been evaluated for safety 
through SSE. This system is either modified and/or reconfigured to integrate and 
interact with System A and B to accomplish a different outcome (than it was 
designed for). System C is installed in platform J.
These three systems are interconnected and integrated and will be required to 
perform joint execution of tasks. In fact these three systems are now one larger, 
more complex system, called a system of systems, a meta-system, a federation (of 
systems), or in military terms, a combat system. The integration, interrelation and 
interconnection capability is accomplished by SoS Engineering (SoSE), and that 









Figure 3.5- Complex System of Systems
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3.4.2 SoSE
In SoS operational environment, multiple legacy, new or hybrid complex systems 
are integrated and configured to create a larger, more complex system whose 
operational outcome is greater than any individual system’s output. The SoSE is 
an evolution (more than an extension) of traditional Systems Engineering (SE).
For this discussion, we use the same example as above, three systems, A, B and 
C. Each systems has been developed under individual SE program development, 
with no interoperability requirement when it was designed, and may have diverse 
operating environment (OE), computer languages, mission requirements, etc. 
Each system may be deployed in different geographical location, on a different 
platform, and under different military service, etc. each system has had an 
individual system safety program and therefore each individual system hazards 
have been either eliminated or controlled in its level. Figure 3.6 shows the three 
heterogeneous systems that will be integrated to create a system of systems.
SYS A
Figure 3.6- System of Systems Engineered via SoSE
The means by which the system of systems can be designed and produced is SoS 
Engineering, and specifically, SoSE methodology.
SoSE Methodology
SoSE methodology development is in the embryonic stages (Keating, Sousa-Posa, 
and Mun, 2003). The methodology to engineer systems of systems must be 
flexible and adaptable. This methodology must resolve interoperability 
impediments that are hinders to effective performance and safe operation. SoSE 
must have an ability to oversee the effective progression of teams from one phase 
to another without adversely affecting the proper implementation of system of 
systems requirements and system of systems safety requirements. This 
methodology will support verification and validation of safety interoperability 
requirements. The verification shall include the “no-path” as well as “path”
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testing. The “no-path” testing refers to “negative” safety requirements within the 
engagement sequence.
Ability to Expand
Another highlight of the methodology is that it allows for the expansion of the 
Federation. Its adaptive nature and flexibility allows for extensibility capability. 
SoSSE will be an integral part of SoSE, in that its methodology to conduct the 
SoS safety program will be “mirrored” to SoSE methodology in respect to phases 
o f development and the analyses of artifacts. The SoSE methodology must be 
responsive to the dynamic nature of SoS environment. Keating suggests (Keating, 
Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003) that the meta system requirements must be 
developed from a holistic systems perspective, and they must consider the wide 
array of organizational, managerial, and contextual constraints (not just 
technological constraints) influencing the development of the complex system.
Guided by System Principles
Keating and Sousa-Posa developed a set of guiding principles to direct and assist 
the development of SoSE methodology (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003). 
Chapter II, paragraph 2.1.1 lists these system principles. O f these systems 





• System Outcome Achievement
• Complex System transformation
• Self Organization
• Iteration
Again, it is important to remember that SoS safety engineering will be relying in 
part on SoSE for the designing safety into the meta-system.
Reliability/ System Failures
A part of SoSE is to develop criteria for reliability threshold. The system 
reliability is directly linked to system failures. System failures are typically 
caused by inadequacy of requirements, mismatches, misinformation, 
incompatibility, system crashes, etc. About a third of reliability failures are also 
safety failures (Alborzi, 2002). Figure 3.7 shows this linkage.
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Figure 3.7- Reliability Failures and Safety Failures Overlap
SoSE focuses on software reliability. It attempts to create redundancy or by other 
means to increase the software’s fault tolerance. Although, this may help a little 
in discovering the coding errors and other errors associated with implementation 
o f requirements, it does little to prevent safety faults. This overlap presented 
above must act as a catalyst in SoSE to create a culture change, one that truly 
integrates safety into its design, where safety can become an indivisible property 
o f the system. It must be understood in SoSE community that merely increasing 
reliability, does not necessarily increases the safety of the system.
Many engineers believe that safety and reliability are one and the same. The 
Figure 3.4.e shows that, indeed, there is an overlap, but the two are not the same. 
Reliability is focused on preventing component failures and increasing system’s 
availability. Safety is focused on accident prevention. Components failures can 
occur without an accident occurring, and an accident can occur without a 
component failure.
There are usually three reasons why accidents occur even though the reliability of 
the system is high and acceptable (Leveson, 1999):
1. The software correctly implemented the requirements, but requirements specify 
behavior that is not safe from a system perspective (safety requirements analysis 
would be able to catch this item.)
2. The requirements do not specify some particular behavior that is required for 
safety (new safety requirements derived from requirements analysis and added to 
the system specification would mitigate this issue.)
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3. The software has unintended (and unsafe) behavior beyond what is specified in 
requirements. (Only code analysis by a safety engineer can discover this 
problem.)
Modeling Differences
Some of the incompatibilities, mismatches, and misinformation are part of 
modeling differences that must be resolved in SoSE. The interoperability 
impediments need to be resolved during the engineering effort. Recall that 
modeling differences were on top of the list when interoperability impediments 
were discussed.
Interoperability Resolution Methods
To enable heterogeneous systems to interoperate and perform joint execution of 
tasks, these modeling issues need to be resolved before system safety issues are 
analyzed. The SoSE must employ a method or methods to resolve these modeling 
differences. Two methods were discussed in Chapter II:
1. The Object-Oriented Method for Interoperability. This analysis uses OOMI as 
the foundation for the study of system safety interoperability of complex systems 
of systems.
2. The Holistic Framework for Software Engineering (HFSE) was also discussed 
in chapter II. This framework allows software engineers to trace dependencies, to 
document decision-making process, and all the important information, and make 
it available to all development team for a coherent, consist use of data. The 
strength of HFSE is that it is integrated with Quality Function Deployment, a 
requirement-based methodology to ensure the accuracy, designation (for example 
designation of safety) and tracing of requirements.
The OOMI and HFSE will be the foundation on which SSIF will be employed. If 
used, these two approaches for resolving interoperability issues will be a part of 
System of Systems Engineering (SoSE) methodology. As an alternative, any 
means of resolving interoperability issues associated with modeling issues and 
associated with lack of coherent framework for software development, can be 
implemented. SSIF assumes the interoperability capability is a property of the 
design.
As an integral part of SoSE (see Figure 3.8) the SoS Safety Engineering will need 
to be conducted simultaneously and in concert with SoSE to resolve the 
interoperability issues and failures that pose safety risk. The next section will 
encompass the integrated SoSSE.
3.4.3 SoSSE
The means by which a meta-system can be analyzed for safety is through a SoS 
Safety Engineering (SoSSE) program. This program will focus on the safety
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issues involving the meta system. The hazards at the subsystem level have been 
resolved at the system level within the SSE. The hazards that exist and originate 
at any of the subsystems and can contribute to the overall risk of the meta system, 
that is, can contribute to a mishap at the meta system level will be identified, 
analyzed, and corrected via SoSSE, which is an integrated element of SoSE. 
Figure 3.8 shows this relationship. The “integration” into SoSE requires teaming 
with other development groups of systems in the federation. This teaming is 
conceptualized by an integrated system safety working group. This will be 
discussed in the following paragraph.
SoSE
SoSSE
Figure 3.8- Integrated SoS Safety Engineering
SoSSE Methodology
SoS safety engineering methodology is a mechanism and an engineering mean by 
which the safe performance of mission requirements is achieved. As stated earlier, 
no formal, structured, and disciplined methodology exists for SoSSE at this 
writing.
The following are the essential ‘ingredients’ of development and execution of an 
effective safety methodology for SoSE:
1. It must be system-based.
2. It must be based on system safety principles.
3. It must be responsive (flexible) to the dynamic and fluid nature of SoS 
development.
4. Safety Requirements must be derived, analyzed, and verified from holistic 
system perspective
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5. It must be developed on system principles. System principles essential for 
development of a SoSE methodology are included, but not limited, to:
a. Unity of System purpose. This means the subsystems must structure the 
safety activities, objectives and approach with maximizing safety of the 
combat system (not individual system).
b. Iterative (Gibson, 1991). This means that designing and deploying and 
transforming complex SoS are iterative processes that evolve, as more 
information becomes known.
c. System Context (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003). This principle 
refers to the set of relevant circumstances, conditions, and patterns that 
both constrain and enable the development of system solutions, operation, 
deployment and transformation.
d. Compatibility (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003). This principle refers 
to compatibility of objectives for the redesign and the approach taken for 
those objectives.
e. Dynamic Stability (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 2003). The ability of 
system to respond positively to the unknown turbulent events in the 
operational environment is one of the safety objectives for the safe 
performance of the SoS.
6. It must contain processes that are not too prescriptive, but allows for creative 
thinking.
7. It must be in harmony with SoSE methodology. They must compliment each 
other not be in conflict with each other.
Integrated System Safety Working Group
Integrated System Safety Working Group (ISSWG) consists of representative 
from system engineering, development, testing effort plus users, stakeholders of 
each system of Federation, and safety boards. The Principals for Safety and safety 
engineers from all participating systems will be permanent members. The 
Principal for Safety (PFS) of the overall SoS chairs this working group. Figure 3.9 
shows the interactions of ISSWG with the various development teams.
The responsibility of each person is to report any concerns that seem to be 
inhibitive to work’s objectives. Each PFS for subsystems is responsible to identify 
and report any hazards, causal factors contributing to any hazard that may have 
safety impact on the overall system of systems performance to the SoS PFS. The 
analysis and risk assessment of the identified SoS safety hazards are the 
responsibility of the SoS PFS or designee.
The sponsors, stakeholders or their representatives have a responsibility of 
ensuring that funds are available for SoS level safety program and that issues 
concerning schedules, resources or safety boards are promptly taken care of.
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As a part of SoSE, the modeling problems between systems will be resolved, and 
the resolution will need to have safety engineer’s involvement to ensure the safe 
implementation of the design. OOMI and HFSE are two methods for resolving 
the heterogeneity of the systems that pose safety risk.
It is the responsibility of ISSWG members to discuss and finalize the SoS level 
hazards, potential mishaps, causal factors, and all interoperability issues. It is the 
responsibility of this working group to finalize the list of tasking tailored to the 
needs of the overall system and prepare a safety schedule to accomplish these 
tasks.
The combat system PFS will be the oversight authority to assess the quality and 
effectiveness of the SoS SSP and review testing reports for verification of safety 
requirements. The final assessment of residual risk of the overall combat system 
will be reported by the combat system PFS to the sponsoring agent.
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Tasks / Activities
As a part of SoSSE, the following activities or tasks will be essential for 
conducting an effective SoS safety program. Note that these activities are not 
“systematic” in nature, that is, step one does not always precede the second and 
the second does not always precede the third, etc. These activities are iterative, 
overlapping and “circular” in nature. The safety engineering for SoS, in most part, 
mimics the SoSE in that it is flexible and fluid in nature. It is able to change, to 
conform, to adapt, and to use synergy form other activities and products.
Program Plan- a comprehensive program plan must be written to encompass 
activities, schedules, processes and methodologies for analysis of all involved 
subsystems. The plan will be signed by design agent and by stakeholders. The 
roles and responsibilities of the SoS safety program team must be delineated in a 
clear manner. This program plan is in addition to the individual systems program 
plan. This plan focuses on the combat system safety program.
Safety Requirements (SR) Analyses (includes Interoperability 
Requirements)- Each system will perform its own requirements analysis. The 
Requirements that are applicable to the overall mission, at the SoS level, and are 
safety related will be identified, flagged and discussed at ISSWG. The safety 
engineers will do analysis for requirements’ completeness, soundness, testability, 
applicability and safety impact. The interoperability requirements are analyzed for 
their source-destination aspects, their definitiveness of starting action and 
conclusion action on the part of systems involved, the content of information 
being exchanged. Each requirement may be aggregated to smaller requirements, 
creating “nodes”. This definition is vital on the safety testing events. Figure 3.10 
shows this definition.
Figure 3.10- The Node Aggregation of SoS Safety Requirements
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For example:
SRI: The overall System state shall be Tactical, Training or Offline.
SR2: The offline state shall be when the system is unable to support operations, 
including power off, operational software loading, system wide maintenance, or 
system failure condition.
SR3: The Tactical states shall be the normal powered on state, including the 
ability to support mission operations, processor failure, and replay.
SR4: The Training state shall be when the team training is planned to be 
performed across platforms.
SR5: The Training status shall be displayed at all consoles.
SR6: The Training tracks shall be designated with a “T” for easy distinction.
The requirements analysis process must include interrelation (as graphed above), 
development of a matrix, discrepancy/ incompleteness resolution, and 
development of definition (that is a final list of safety requirements). The 
designations of these safety requirements in the overall development matrix must 
be visible to all SoSE teams.
Hazards Identification and Analysis- Hazards are identified for their impact on 
SoS. The casual factors are identified and reported to development team. SoS 
Hazard Analysis (SoSHA) will include the discussion of what are the interface 
requirements, interfaces and interactions between systems, what types of Safety 
critical data (SCD) are passed and acted upon by systems, etc. it will also include 
recommendation or statements for controls, safety kernel, safety features, for 
mitigations.
Identification and Analysis of Safety Critical Functions (SCF)- These are the 
software that computes the safety critical data (SCD). In U.S. Navy systems, any 
function that controls either directly or indirectly the pre-arming, arming, 
launching, firing, or detonation of a weapon system is a safety critical function. 
The “indirectly” applies to the functions that are used (contributors) for 
engagements, for example, the identification friend or foe. Other SCFs are Break 
Engage, Hold Fire, and Cease Fire.
HMI or Operational & Support Analysis
Human Machine Interface (HMI) analysis is performed for operator-related errors 
as the result of interaction of operator with the software. In other words, these are 
software-driven errors made by the operator. Interface issues such as displays are 
also analyzed.
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Safe Interoperability Analysis- This analysis consists of identifying what are 
interoperability issues that pose safety risk, finding the root causes for the 
problems, and ensuring the resolution of the those problems. As a part of SoSE, 
the modeling problems between systems will be resolved, and the resolution will 
need to have safety engineer’s involvement to ensure the safe implementation of 
the design. OOMI and HFSE are two methods for resolving the heterogeneity of 
the systems that pose safety implications.
SSIF is not contingent upon the use of these methods but is contingent upon the 
use of a method that resolves the modeling difference and requirements 
dependency issue by the development team within the SoSE. The problems are 
typically format difference, representation differences, validity differences, etc as 
stated in Chapter II.
The interoperability analysis differs slightly from SHA-System Hazard Analysis, 
even if  it were to be expanded to apply to SoS. The difference is that SHA’s 
primary focus is to ensure the integrity of the interface and the successful 
transmit-receipt of messages. Interoperability. The interoperability analysis 
focuses not only on the exchange of information, but also the integrity of 
interoperation of functions or tasks being requested.
Safety Robustness Analysis
This analysis is not typically done in system safety primarily because the 
“robustness” is thought of as a design-for-performance feature. But unsafe 
situation arise from some “collision” of interactions that failed a test, or lacked 
information or input that it needed to have, even in non-safety critical portions of 
the software; note that non-safety critical software are interconnected with safety 
critical software.
There are three items (Leveson, 1999) that makeup the criteria for Safety 
Robustness:
1. Every state must have a behavior (transition) defined for every possible input.
2. The logical OR of the conditions on every transition out of any state must form 
a tautology.
3. Every state must have a software behavior (transition) defined in case there is 
no input for a given period of time (a timeout).
The above criteria ensures that if there is a trigger condition for a state to handle 
inputs within a range, there will also be a clearly defined transition to handle data 
that is out of range. The third criterion ensures that there will be a requirement for 
a time-out that specifies what to do in case no input is received.
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Safety Threads- As a part of interoperability analysis, the safety critical ‘threads’ 
are identified and analyzed for safety of operation. For example, when a system 
within the federation is requesting the other system to break an engagement 
because it just received a valid “friendly” ID, the thread of interactions need to be 












^  System C
Figure 3.11- An Example of Safety Thread Analysis
Note that processing 3 refers to the processing after processing 2, that is, the 
sequence of events, not a “name” of a processing. To clarify this even more, once 
processing 2 is completed and a feedback is received, based of whether the 
feedback is WILCO or CANCO, a processing will be initiated that either will go 
to system B or system C, but it will be one action taken based on the feedback, 
and that is why we call it processing 3.
Verification and Validation- The SoS safety program will invest a great deal of 
effort on verification and validation of SoS safety requirements, and verification 
of implementation of design in the source code. The validation includes the 
transmission of messages from another systems and its reception in the receiving
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system, its understandability and its acceptance. This requirement also ensures 
that the “command” or “response” needed from the receiving system is validated 
to be the proper response at the proper time. This implies “decision-making” 
capability by the receiving system to comply with a request or wait for further 
information. This type of validation is essential for the safety of the system’s 
operation.
The safety testing at SoS must be an integrated, concerted effort with the SoS 
Testing team. The envisioned safety testing is conceptualized in Figure 3.12.







T petfno / 1
Figure 3.12- Safety Interoperability Testing for SoS
3.4.4 SCD
Safety Critical Data (SCD) is the next topic to discuss, as it is one of SSIF 
characterization attributes. SCD are computed during run time by the SCFs and 
are analyzed as a part of the SoSSE. SCD exists in all safety critical applications 
and systems, such as missile systems, command and control systems, explosive 
systems, and nuclear systems. It is the robust design and thorough safety analysis 
o f SCFs and SCD interactions that identifies, eliminates or controls the risk in the 
system.
The crucial role of analyzing the SCD in SoS, is evident when we remember the 
recent past’s accidents of complex systems. The Three Mile Island incident, the 
Challenger disaster, the Russia’s Chernobyl nuclear power plant accident, the 
Shuttle Colombia’s tragedy, all are evidence for the need to conduct a preventive 
system safety program that is system-based, logical, and with depth and breath 
that it requires.
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Safety Integrity of Data
In software safety the safetyness of SCD is a great concern for engineers. No 
matter how well the logic of software is written, if the data that will populate that 
logic is faulty, then the results will be faulty. Faulty or erroneous data can cause a
system to operate unsafely, and may lead to a catastrophic accident. Stalhane
says, “the software system always communicates with its environment through 
data values, so dangerous events are...connected to incorrect data values” 
(Herrmann, 1999).
Some of the ways to monitor the safety integrity of data is to:
• Ensure that intended data is correctly accessed (keywords are intended and 
correctly.)
• Ensure that SCD is not corrupted
• Ensure the validity of data
• Checking for out-of-bound parameters
• There is no unused data
• Ensure that there is no memory conflicts
• Ensure error detection/ alerts reporting for SCD
• Identify Safety critical interfaces
• Ensure the integrity of tactical data and training data
• Ensure no self-modifying code, especially in safety critical functions
• Check for unused or dead code (and remove them from the source code)
• Ensure that “Exceptions” are processed correctly
Hazard
Hazard is a condition of a system that, together with other conditions in the 
environment of the system will lead inevitably to an accident (Leveson, 1999). 
The SCD contains any combination of those conditions stated above. The 
identification of hazards in the system starts with studying the SCD of the system. 
The main objective is to ‘discover’ the hazards before the system is ready to 
operate.
Since we are speaking of “data” and software, the hazards can only be within the 
scope of its system’s design, not associated merely with software. For example, 
the hazard, Launch on non-hostile, is associated with a function called, Launch 
Procedure, with, say, 100 source lines of code. The 100 lines of code, in 
themselves, are neither safe nor unsafe, but when the code is executed, and directs 
the control of a launcher to launch a missile at a “friendly”, we have a 
catastrophe. So the hazard of Launch on non-hostile, associated with the Launch 
Procedure is in existence, but will not create an accident unless the code (SCD) 
executes and interacts with the system, and based on the wrong ID (SCD), it fires 
at a friendly unit.
Role of SCD in Accidents
Accidents often occur not only by one contributor or causal factor, but by a 
combination of interactions between human, system and their environment. In
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complex system of systems, all components and subsystems including human and 
the environment on which the meta system is operating are interacting directly or 
indirectly. Safety can be looked at as a quality of the system, and so it is 
controlled by set of controls or enforced by a set of constraints. Accidents occur 
when one or more of these constraints are violated when components are 
interacting. The violation can be a lack of constraint or a constraint that was over 
a threshold in real world. In complex system of systems, software is the controller 
and so it is software that enforces the constraints since it controls the interaction 
of the components. Software, then, is a contributor to accidents by not enforcing 
the constraints (safety critical features) or by bypassing a constraint and so 
violating it. Accidents, in complex systems, occur because a safety critical 
function of the system failed and the failure had an impact on the rest of the 
interactions and lead to an accident. As a part of software analysis, the safety 
engineer must identify safety critical functions (SCF) and safety critical data 
(variables, messages, etc.) to the developers for accurate implementation of 
design. Early involvement of engineers enables them to influence the design so 
the right constraints and controls are planted in the code for safe execution later.
From discussion above, it is clear that the integrity, accuracy, and validity of SCD 
in interoperability (the interactions of components of systems) are vital to the safe 
operation of the system of systems, and this, in turn, testifies to the crucial role it 
plays in interoperability and the reason behind being an attribute of the SSIF 
characterization.
3.5 EVALUATION OF SSIF AGAINST SSI CRITERIA
3.5.1 Initial Validation of SSIF
As a part of evaluation of its viability to be used for analysis of Aegis BMD 
program, the SSIF was presented for review and validation to three subject matter 
experts. The three experts have many years of engineering and system safety 
engineering experience and have served as Principal for Safety for U.S. 
Government for several of Navy’s complex war-fighting systems. A short 
biography of each expert can be viewed in Appendix B.
The criteria used by subject matter experts are as follows:
• Applicability to SoS operational environment
• Capture of interoperation capability
• Lessons-Leamed (from Gulf war, Iraq War, and near-miss accidents)
• Professional Experience
Three subject matter experts developed the criteria and the list is the compiled 
criteria. For example expert one may have had 2 of the four criteria above, and 
expert 2 may have had 3 out of four, and expert three may have had another 
combination of three out of four. The author asked for the criteria from each
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expert and each list was combined without redundancy (that is if two experts has 
lessons learned, it was stated once, as it is shown above). The list above shows the 
compilation of experts’ criteria used for validation of SSIF.
The detail on this initial validation is provided in Appendix B. Appendix B also 
includes the process used to choose the three experts and the transcripts of the 
approval.
3.5.2 Evaluation of SSIF
Now that we described SSIF and explained how it is characterized and what the 
characterization attribute encompasses, it needs to be evaluated against the system 
safety interoperability criteria that we developed in paragraph 2.7. Table 3.1 
shows the results of the evaluation.
A: SoS-based
B: Address of Model Correlation
C: Knowledge /Safety Requirements of Remote Operations (interfaces)
D: Feedback (validation &verification) Capability
E: Translation Methodology (messages, representation of entities, etc.)
F : Safe Federation Extensibility Capability




SoS-based Yes This approach is designed for SoS operational 
environment.
Address of Model 
Correlation
Yes This approach is founded on Object-Oriented 
Method for Interoperability (OOMI). This 
method enables the resolution of modeling 
differences and enables interoperability of joint 
tasks. Some of these modeling conflicts are 
safety critical, and the resolution of these items 






Yes This approach has the requirements analysis as 
one of the core tasks and it is done within the 
SoSSE. Not only the knowledge of the remote 
interfaces is within the framework, but also the 
analysis of the interfaces to facilitate the safe 




Yes Verification and validation refers to the ability of 
the system to give feedback to the transmitting 
system that a message (and the type of message) 
is received. It also refers to the ability of the 
system to validate a message for further action.
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SSIF is designed to allow this capability in its 
SoS safety program for safe operations.
Translation
methodology
Yes As a core entity of the system of systems, 
translator is used to resolve the many kinds 
heterogeneity of systems. One method to use is 
the OOMI using 2(n) architecture. SSIF is 
intended to be used on basis of OOMI for 
resolution of modeling differences used in 




Yes SSIF is capable to be extended. The adaptive 
design of SSIF is to allow for change in 
configuration, by adding new systems. The 
adaptive and flexible SoSSE allows for such 
extensibility.
Based on this evaluation and the validation of three experts, SSIF will be used to 
evaluate the safety interoperability issues in AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense 
baseline 3.0. After the implementation, the SSIF will be adjusted, if  needed, to 
represent a framework that can be used to analyze the real-world system of 
systems from safety standpoint.
3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY
In this chapter, the many dimensions of interoperability were discussed and the 
argument on why safety is a dimension of interoperability was clearly explained. 




• Communication / Information
• Security
• System Safety
We also learned about the challenges facing system safety in relation to the 
Navy’s system of systems environment. The challenges were:
• Lack of Standards
• Lack of SoSSE
• Lack of SoSSE methodology
• Lack of adaptable/software-focused analysis tools
• Lack of overall SoS Safety Interoperability Framework to be used in 
guiding the SoSSE program.
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In this chapter, we presented a System of Systems Safety Interoperability 
Framework that can be used to frame the problems associated with 
interoperability of safety critical data. Three subject-matter experts using their 
own developed criteria initially validated this framework. Then, we looked at the 
system safety interoperability framework (SSIF) and learned how it is 
characterized. The characterization attributes discussed were SoS, SoSE, SoSSE, 
and SCD. Each characterization attribute was explained in detail. The highlights 
of each attribute are:
• SOS: Integration of two or more legacy, heterogeneous complex systems 
into one larger, more complex system.
• SoSE: Methodology, ability to expand, guided by system principles, 
reliability/system failures, modeling differences, interoperability 
resolution methods.
• SOSSE: Integrated w/SoSE, integrated SSWG, tasks/activities, program 
plan, safety requirements analysis, hazard identification/analysis, safe 
interoperability analysis, safety robustness analysis, safety threads, 
verification and validation.
• SCD: Hazard, role of SCD in Accidents
At last, we evaluated the SSIF against the criteria we had developed in Chapter II 
for analysis of safe interoperability issues of complex combat systems, and it 
clearly met all the criteria.
In the next chapter, the SSIF will be used to analyze a real-world complex system 
of systems.
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CHAPTER IV
ANALYSIS OF AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSLE DEFENSE (BMD)
3.0 USING SSIF- A USE CASE
The [FAAJ administrator was interviewed for a documentary film  on the [Paris 
DC-10] accident. He was asked how he could still consider the infamous baggage 
door safe, given the door failure proven in the Paris accident and the precursor 
accident in Windsor, Ontario. The Administrator replied—and not facetiously 
either— “o f course it is safe, we certified it. ”
-C.O. Miller 
A Comparison o f Military and Civilian 
Approaches to Aviation Safely
4.1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
In Chapter I, it was stated that this research intends to answer two questions:
• What is system safety interoperability?
• How can safety interoperability be analyzed for a complex combat 
system?
The previous chapters have been successful in answering the first question. In 
Chapter I, we defined system safety interoperability as,
“A capability encompassing many o f the safety issues relative to integration, 
compatibility and interface that are impinging upon the effectiveness with which 
independent, heterogeneous and/or homogeneous systems, components or 
elements, including human factor, may safely interact ’’(Alborzi, 2004).
We also provided one hypothetical example in Chapter I, paragraph 1.6, “Safety 
Interoperability”, and another example in Chapter II, paragraph 2.6.2, “Pre- 
Mature Launch” to demonstrate the concept of system safety interoperability. In 
this chapter a system safety interoperability statement will be provided that 
further establishes what system safety interoperability is in the Navy’s combat 
systems.
The second question is how can SSI be analyzed. The two existing approaches 
for analyzing a complex system of systems in respect to safety interoperability 
were presented and evaluated (see Chapter III) against the criteria that were 
derived as the result of literature review, and the results were noted in Chapter III. 
The SSIF approach, that is, analyzing a complex system of systems for safe
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interoperability issues by using a framework was developed, validated by three 
subject-matter experts, and evaluated against the same criteria. The SSIF met all 
the criteria, and therefore it will be used in this chapter to analyze the AEGIS 
Ballistic Missile Defense 3.0 program.
NOTE: As stated in chapter I, “Assumptions/ Limitations”, no classified 
information will be used in this analysis, and all “sensitive” information will 
either not be used or will be denoted with “X” for security reasons. In 
addition, this chapter will not be released to the public without the written 
approval of the U.S. government. All attempts are made to keep this analysis 
high-level without an effect on the content and integrity of the analysis.
4.2 AEGIS BMD BLOCK 04 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
Mission Statement
The primary AEGIS BMD mission statements are (BMD, 2004):
•To Deliver an enduring, operationally effective and supportable Ballistic Missile 
Defense capability in Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers, for the defense of the U.S., 
our deployed forces, allies.
•To increase the effectiveness of the greater Ballistic Missile Defense System 
(BMDS) by both providing and gaining synergy from other BMDS elements
Background
Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is planning the development and fielding of the 
missile defense in two-year blocks, (BMD, 2004) with each block more capable 
than previous one. The first block- the Block 04 consists of:
Aegis BMD 3.0E -  provides Aegis Destroyers with Long Range Surveillance & 
Track (LRS&T) capability. BMD 3.0E is authorized to provide LRS&T support 
to Ground-based Missile Defense (GMD) systems.
Aegis BMD 3.0 -  provides Aegis Cruisers with the capability to serve as a test 
bed for SM-3 Flight Test Missions and if  ordered to do so, provide an Emergency 
Deployment capability. BMD 3.0 is planned for installation in FY-05 and will be 
authorized for test engagements of short and medium range ballistic missiles and 
LRS&T support to GMD. Pre-production SM-3 BLK I missiles will be used. 
Aegis BMD 3.0 is the program to be used in this research as a use case for 
analysis of safety interoperability capability based on SSIF.
Aegis BMD 3.1 -  provides Aegis BMD engagement capability and is currently 
planned for deployment in FY-06. Aegis BMD 3.1 will be certified for BMD 
mission requirements and will provide a limited self-defense capability. SM-3 
BLK IA production missiles with an X year shelf life will be employed. Full
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implementation of Aegis BMD 3.1 will consist of up to X SM-3 BLK IA missiles 
on X Aegis Cruisers and X LRS&T equipped Aegis Destroyers.
Figure 4.1 shows the mission concept (Aegis, 2004).
Figure 4.1- AEGIS BMD 3.0 Engagement Mission
System Description
Aegis BMD (ABMD) is a system of three systems. ABMD system of systems is, 
in itself, a subsystem to the BMDS. The three systems forming a system of 
systems are:
• AEGIS Weapons System
• Vertical Launching System
• Standard Missile-3 System
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Figure 4.2- AEGIS BMD Combat System
4.2.1 Aegis Weapon System (AWS)
The AWS is a shipboard weapon system characterized by rapid reaction, 
continuous availability, high firepower, and environmental immunity.
The AWS is further decomposed to more complex subsystems, and it is shown 
inside the blue dotted lines, Figure 4.3. The AWS subsystems include:
• Weapon Control System (WCS)
• AN SPY -1 /1B Radar system (SPY)
• Command and Decision System (CDS)
• Mission Planner (MP)
• Aegis Display System (ADS)
• Aegis Training Control System (ACTS)—Not operational for BMD 
missions
• Operational Readiness Test System (ORTS)
Functional Capabilities
AWS is a command and control system capable of detecting and engaging threats. 
Table 4.1 provides the functional capabilities of AWS. Safety Critical Functions 
is determined from this table.
















Figure 4.3- Aegis Weapon System
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4.2.2 Vertical Launching System (VLS)
MK 41 VLS is a general purpose launching system capable of launching missiles 
for air, surface, and underwater engagements. As a part of the ship's total combat 
system, the VLS has the capability to load, stow, select and fire the missiles. 
Each missile is launched perpendicular to the ship's horizontal reference plane 
from a canister contained within a VLS launch module and located below deck. 
The electronically operated cell deck hatch, together with the module top surface, 
forms the weather deck and provides ballistic protection for the missiles (missile 
rounds) contained in the launcher.
VLS components include:
• Launch Control Computer Program (LCCP)
• Launch Sequencer (LSEQ)
• VLS GPs Interface (VGI)
VLS is further decomposed in Figure 4.4.
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Figure 4.4- Vertical Launching System
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Functional Capabilities
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4.2.3 STANDARD Missile-3 (SM-3)
The SM-3 is guided through four phases of flight:
Boost: During the pre-launch period, batteries are activated, built-in tests (BIT) 
are performed, and the booster arms and ignites. The boost phase is the period 
from missile’s first motion until booster electrical separation from the second- 
stage after approximately X seconds. Guidance provides booster nozzle 
commands, limits total lateral angular acceleration of the missile, and controls
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missile dispersion to ensure missile beacon capture by AWS. Boost guidance is 
performed autonomously onboard the missile.
Midcourse endo-atmospheric (stage 2): The midcourse endo-atmospheric phase 
is the period from booster separation to third stage separation. Uplink AWS 
midcourse guidance missile body acceleration commands provide control fin 
commands to maintain missile stability and execute WCS steering commands. 
The second stage is guided by WCS to the next command point and is released 
from the third stage.
Midcourse exo-atmospheric (stage3): The midcourse exo-atmospheric phase is 
the period from third stage separation to KW separation. Guidance provides 
TSRM nozzle angle and roll attitude commands to maintain missile stability and 
guide the missile for minimum KW zero effort miss. Third stage guidance is 
effective only during TSRM bum.
Terminal phases: The terminal phase is the period from KW separation to 
intercept. KW guidance is autonomous once the KW IR sensor has acquired the 
target in its field of view. KW IR sensor target tracking data provides body axis 
divert commands to intercept.
SM-3 is further decomposed in Figure 4.5.




Stage 3 CPU 









A ssp m h ly Baceu
Regulator Board
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Functional Capabilities
SM-3 system has capability to intercept air, surface, and underwater threats, 
including multi-mission launcher capability (SM-2, SM-2 Block IV, VLA, TH, 
and SM-3). Included in the above capability is the capability to load, stow, and 
select the missiles, and to perform Built-In-Test (BIT).
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4 .3  A N A L Y S IS
The basis for the analysis is the System Safety Interoperability Framework 
(SSIF). SSIF will be applied to this meta-system, also referred to as the combat 
system, for analysis of interoperability issues from system safety standpoint. As 
stated in Chapter III, these activities and the use of SSIF characterization 
attributes are spiral and non-linear in nature. The analysis approach is not purely 
systematic, but primarily systemic and iterative. However, some activities will 
have to happen before others. For example the requirements analyses will be 
performed before the safety integrity analysis. We will “iteratively” be involved 
in the domain of the following four attributes during the analysis. The first two
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attributes are prerequisites for an effective and successful safety interoperability 
analysis, thus they are discussed first.
• One of the attributes of SSIF characterization is System of Systems (SoS). 
For ABMD 3.0, we identified the systems that are required to be 
integrated and interoperable in paragraph 4.2, and provided detail 
descriptions of each system’s capabilities, and the role it plays in the SoS. 
More detail on identification and the safety criticality is explained in SoS 
attribute in paragraph 4.3.1.
•  SoSE will be discussed to some extent. This discussion will include the 
interoperability “enablers” that are applied to the SoS, and have been 
discussed in previous chapters as methods to resolve interoperability 
conflicts.
• The SoSSE will be performed to analyze the ABMD. In this analysis, this 
effort will be ‘abbreviated’ and tailored since, 1) we are only evaluating 
the interoperation activities that have safety implications, 2) risk 
assessment is not the objective of this evaluation. As a part of the safety 
engineering and analysis, safety critical interfaces, functions, potential 
mishaps, hazards, will be identified and evaluated.
• The SCD will be discussed (as a part of SoSSE). SCD will be computed in 
the safety critical functions and will be related to identified hazards, 
interfaces, and potential undesirable events. Safety interoperability 
analysis will be done using the SCD.
The Approach Used to Apply SSIF to ABMD
Since interoperability is made possible by data being transmitted and used by 
systems in the federation, for a high-level mission requirement, the “integrity ” 
and safety of that data is crucial for an effective interoperation. The Safety 
Critical Data (SCD) is data used, manipulated, and transformed by safety critical 
functions of the meta system. During the design, it is safety critical functions 
(SCF) that are identified, evaluated for “go” and “no-go” paths. Before that, it is 
the safety critical requirements that reveal the SCFs. The safety critical 
requirements are identified by overall system requirements analysis and by 
derived requirements based on whether or not the existing requirements meets the 
safety principles and precepts. For this task, the system specifications, especially 
Interface Design Specification (IDS) between the safety critical systems are 
reviewed. The interface criticality of the subsystems is determined by using 
“interface analysis”.
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Since the scope of this analysis does not include hardware related risk assessment 
(determining the probability and severity of a hardware failure), the current 
analysis tools such as Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) or Energy Trace Barrier 
Analysis (ETBA) will not be useful. Also, since this analysis is limited to safety 
implications of interoperability-related software, it is determined that current FTA 
and ETBA are not adequate to meet the needs of software analysis. To assess the 
overall software risk, however, an analysis tool(s) must be developed to respond 
to many different combinations of behavioral situations within a piece of safety 
critical software. This deficiency will be reflected in “Recommendations” section 
in Chapter IV.
In this analysis, we will look to see how SSIF can be used to analyze the safety 
interoperability issues. Therefore, ‘abbreviated’ version of an ideal SoSSE 
methodology will be used. Also, the analysis tool will be “interface analysis” that 
is shown in the analysis approach.
Figure 4.6 shows approach taken to apply the SSIF to ABMD for the purpose of 









SCI: Safety Critical Interface SCM: Safety Critical
Figure 4.6- Approach for SSIF Application
4.3.1 ABMD System of Systems (SoS) Identification
Recall Figure 4.7. SoS is identified as the combat system consisting of three 
complex systems, AWS, VLS and SM-3. The combat system is in itself a 
subsystem to BMDS. It interfaces directly with Ground-based Midcourse Defense 
System (GMDS). GMDS system is also a subsystem to BMDS. The following 
graph shows the hierarchy of the systems of systems, and the ABMD SoS 
relationship to other systems.
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Figure 4.7- AEGIS BMD SoS
Findings: None. The SoS requirements of SSIF matched the ABMD SoS.
4.3.2 Aegis BMD System of Systems Engineering (SoSE)
ABMD SoSE is a mechanism by which the BMD SoS is designed, produced and 
deployed and /or transformed. The SoSE Integrated Product Team (IPT) consists 









• Reliability/ Maintainability/ Availability
The Aegis BMD used a current single-system development process. There were 
modifications/ deviations when necessary to accommodate the new architecture.
Recall the SSIF’s SoSE attributes of chapter III:
• Methodology and its characteristics,
• Ability to expand,
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• Guided by system principles (System control, system context, boundary 
establishment, system outcome achievement, self-organization, iteration.)
The ABMD was analyzed using these attributes during system engineering effort. 
Figure 4.8 shows the SoSE methodology used for Aegis BMD. (Note: The rest o f 
the analysis will use this figure to evaluate the applicability o f SSIF.)
System control was clearly demonstrated by CDS component of AWS. System 
context was clearly defined by ABMD. This was demonstrated by modifying the 
configuration to “clean up” the context. In other words, the systems and 
capabilities and functions that did not match the system context (that is a system 
o f systems environment for the purpose of engaging a ballistic missile) were 
removed, and so the system context was defined and documented in its true sense.
Iteration occurred during software engineering and unit testing (following the 
concept of build a little, test a little). Functionality or a computer program defect 
was fixed, tested, then fixed again (if needed) and tested again. Then at the end 
the system was tested as a whole.
System Definition and  Design Computer Program Definition 
and Design
Computer Program 
Implementation Computer Program Testing
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Figure 4.8- ABMD SE Methodology (Aegis, 2004)
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Findings
The first 2 bullets above were checked successfully as the SSIF met the 
requirements for extensibility, methodology (shown above) and based on system 
principles. The system of systems engineering methodology envisioned in SSIF 
surpasses that of Aegis BMD SoSE methodology in that it allows for self­
organization
It is the recommendation of this research that any methodology design chosen, 
must be founded on system-based attributes (Keating, Sousa-Posa, and Mun, 
2003) plus system safety principles and precepts. Note that this is in addition to 
safety precepts embedded in SoS safety engineering.
System Safety Precepts- a ‘partial’ foundation for development of a SoSE 
methodology
a. Safety shall be designed into the system of systems and be reassessed if 
transformation is required.
b. There shall be positive measures to prevent exposure of personnel to the 
hazards of radiation, high voltage, toxic materials, excessive noise levels, and 
other potential personnel hazards created by system of systems.
c. There shall be positive measures to prevent the inadvertent firing of a weapon.
d. There shall be positive measures to prevent the chance of fratricide of weapons 
that could result in catastrophic mishap.
e. The system of systems shall provide for positive measures to minimize the 
danger to friendly forces from weapon firings.
f. There shall be positive measures to prevent harm to the environment.
4.3.3 ABMD System of Systems Safety Engineering (SoSSE)
SoSSE effort must be in parallel and in agreement with SoSE effort. The primary 
reason for this requirement is that SoSSE must be an integral part of SoSE if it is 
going to be effective in engineering safety into the system design via SoSE. SSIF 
was applied to ABMD parallel to system analysis activities.
Safety Criticality Criteria
The following is the list of criteria and definitions developed and used, to identify 
the safety critical or related subsystems or components for Aegis BMD SoS.
• Impact on the ship/weapons, assets (e.g. controlled aircraft, helicopter, 
satellites, shuttle, etc.), equipment
• Impact to environment
• Impact on the war-fighters (includes own forces, all friendly forces).
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Safety critical subsystem or component is defined as an entity that directly or 
indirectly controls the release of ordnance or provides data for the launch 
sequence functions.
Safety related subsystem or component is defined as an entity that contributes or 
influences a safety critical function and whose failure contributes to the safety risk 
o f the system.
The approach shown in Figure 4.6 enabled the effective identification of the 
safety critical subsystems/components, interfaces, and messages based on the 
criteria above. The identification of potential undesirable events leads the analyst 
to identifying the hazards that may be contributory factors. Since the scope of this 
research does not include risk assessment, the mitigating factors or controls need 
not be identified.
Safety Critical Subsystems/ Interface Identification 
Safety Critical Interfaces:
The interface between a safety critical subsystem/component to another is safety 
critical interface. For ABMD SoS the safety critical interfaces are marked red in 
Figure 4.9 Safety critical interfaces within the subsystems (AWS, VLS and SM-3) 
are defined and analyzed as the part of “element” SSP, i.e., single system SSP.
The SSIF met the safety interoperability of “Knowledge / safety requirements of 
remote operations (interfaces)” and “Feedback (Validation & Verification)”. 
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Figure 4.9- ABMD Safety Critical Interfaces
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AWS
Safety related subsystems and components:
These are subsystems or components that indirectly are related to the launch 
sequence functionality. For AWS, Aegis Display System (ADS) is safety related, 
because it displays the tactical picture, with its status of actions being taken, it 
assists the operator in making decisions that may have safety implications. ACTS 
is safety related because if  can influence the safety critical functions in respect to 
Training tracks. Training data shall be separate from tactical data and shall be 
visibly known to prevent being used as real data. Note that ACTS is not being 
used in Aegis BMD, and it is merely named here because it is part o f AWS.
Safety critical interfaces:
The interface between a safety critical subsystem/component to another is safety 
critical interface. For ABMD SoS the safety critical interfaces are marked red.
Safety critical subsystems and components:
C&D- it commands and controls engagement orders, it uses IFF function 
internally or by interfacing with UPX-29 IFF system to ID tracks, it also evaluates 
threats and designates threats for engagement.
WCS- it prosecutes engagements, it interfaces with the Missile in Flight 
via SPY radar system, and it can orders Cease Fire and Break Engage.
SPY- it downlinks and uplinks data to the Missile in Flight for guidance.
Safety critical subsystems and components of AWS are shown in Figure 4.10.
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Figure 4.10- AWS Safety Critical Components
V L S
The safety related component for VLS:
VGI- the VGI is part of LCU, and it directly interfaces with the missile, but the 
data it verifies and validates is out of range time information that results in missile 
dud. The missile however does not need this data to launch a missile.
The safety critical components for VLS:
LCCP- selects, launches, and safes missiles.
LSEQ- controls the missile interface, commands the opening and closing of the 
hatch, controls the power supply.
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Figure 4.11- VLS Safety Critical Components
SM-3
Safety critical components
As shown in the graph above, most of the SM-3 components are safety critical— 
KW, DTRM, TSRM, and GP. Figure 4.12 shows all safety critical components of 
SM-3.
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Figure 4.12- SM-3 Safety Critical Components
Aegis BMD SoS Top Level Mishaps (TLM)
TLMs are potential mishaps that may occur during the operation of the combat 
system. Individual single-system hazards that do not contribute to the overall 
combat system, is not included in Table 4.4. The potential mishaps are shown and 
traced to the their associated hazards in subsystems.
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Table 4.4- Aegis BMD SoS TLMs
AEGIS BMD POTENTIAL SoS TLMs
TLMs Associated Hazard(s) Originating 
Subsystem
AWS VLS SM-3
1. Personnel Injury X X X
2. Inadvertent Launch of GMD 
weapon based on ABMD Data
X




Activation of Ordnance 
Energetics
X
5. Prosecution of Non-Hostile/ 
Friendly
X X X
6. Damage to Equipment X X X
4.3.4 ABMD SCD
Aegis BMD System of systems SCD are identified below. Note of reminder that 
SCD portion, as stated earlier, is not a separate tasking; it is embedded as part of 
SoSSE analyses. The primary reason why it has been highlighted as an entity 
within the SSIF is that it is the core of safe interoperability interactions. It is the 
safety critical data that is transmitted, received, processed and performed upon, 
that makes the safety interoperability an issue to study and to analyze.
Safety Critical Data are the data that cross the boundaries of subsystems 
(interfaces) and of AMBD overall SoS and have safety implications. SCD ‘stems’ 
from safety critical functions (SCF) of the meta-system. SCD can be of different 
types- messages, variables, positional information, etc.
Error checking data are also SCD for they check for errors in SCD in real time.
As the result of thorough interface analysis, the safety critical interfaces, functions 
and messages were defined and evaluated for compatibility and verification 
methods. Table 4.5 shows the analysis results.
Note: Safety critical message are not listed in Table 4.5 in order to keep this 
dissertation unclassified.












Table 4.5- ABMD Safety Critical Data
ABMD SAFETY CRTICAL DATA fSCDl
Safety Critical Interface Safety Critical Functions Safety Critical Data
a. AWS (SPY) to SM-3 (only 
when Missile is in flight)
b. SM-3 to AWS
Missile Uplink, engagement Termination 
SM-3 guidance
KW Acquisition and track, aim-point select 
Missile Downlink
MSL positional data, Break Engage 
message, System status, command 
destruct
a. AWS to VLS (WCS to LCU)
b. VLS to AWS
Pre-launch,
Vertical launch Management, Engagement 
Orders/Status, Missile Initialization, missile 
selection, Flight target data
Launch Enable, Fire Inhibit Switch, VLS 
Magazine Authorization/Permission, Launch 
S equence, VLS Mode and Configuration, Missile 
Inventory, VLS Fault, VOTS, multiple missile 
launch separation times, Booster Avoidance 
Processing, and Safe Missile orders, m agazine 
authorization
a. VLS (LSEQ) to SM-3
b. SM-3 to VLS
Pre-launch, missile initialization, Flight 
Target Data processing
Initialization data, ready to launch 
message.
a. AWS (C&D, SPY) to GMD
b. GMD to AWS
C&D Doctrine Qualification, 
Engagement Coordination, 




Target data, IFF data, Training /Test data
t t
Analysis of Design Verification after implementation
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SCD Error Checking
A robust program with safety critical application, typically checks itself for errors 
during run time. Some error checking types look for the length of the message,
e.g. 32 bit vs. 16 bit, some will have checksum exceptions set. The legacy 
program use verification and validation based on the type of message, e.g., the 
command for launch of a Tomahawk missile may be Message type 20, but the 
command for launch of a SM-3 may be message type 100, and a wrong message 
type (based on configuration and the threat posture, etc.) will be rejected safely 
and without an inadvertent shut down or loss of an interface. The analysis of 
Aegis BMD revealed that this meta system uses message type verification and 
validation for checking errors during system operation.
Training / Test
Per Table 4.3.b, one of the SCDs being interoperated by other receiving systems 
is Training or Test data. Recall Table 4.4. The TLM#5 is “ Prosecution of Non- 
Hostile/ Friendly” and TLM#2, “Inadvertent launch of GMD weapon based on 
AWS data”. When this SCD was applied to ABMD, it was revealed that when 
ABMD conduct training or test exercise, it does not have a mechanism to 
distinguish the test or training tracks as simulated; they look like tactical tracks 
both from symbology perspective and from “bit” perspective. The analysis also 
revealed that there is no mechanism for the receiving system (GMD) to interpret 
that data as training or test if it were somehow tagged as training or test data. This 
was revealed by analyzing the interface design documents between the two 
systems.
The SSIF application revealed that SCD transmitted to outside the BMD 
boundary in respect to training or test data cannot be flagged as simulated or be 
interpreted as simulated by GMD. Therefore, a safety issue exists and needs to be 
resolved (see the “Findings” section below).
Hazards and Causal factors
As a part of thorough analysis, the analyst (using an SoSSE methodology) must 
identify the hazards that lead to TLMs. Then the causal factors for each hazard 
will be identified and risk assessment can be made. These follow-up steps are 
outside the scope of this research, and will be recommended for future work.
Findings
The current system safety engineering methodology, even when customized and 
deviated, seems inadequate to analyze the total system. The mapping of SCD in 
SSIF to ABMD safety critical data (see Table 4.5) reveals that the interoperability 
issues can be analyzed from system safety perspective using the current method, 
but applied to all SCD of the system, the methodology seem inadequate. For 
example, when it is desired to assess the risk in software, the Fault Tree Analysis 
cannot be useful, mainly because software failures are influenced by number of
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interactions, and it is difficult to determine the probability of a failure in the 
system’s life cycle.
It is the recommendation of this research that any methodology developed for 
system safety of an SoS, be founded on SoS context, safety principles and 
precepts (listed above), and congruent with development schedule. It is also 
recommended that a new software analysis tool be created (or the current FTA) be 
modified to assess the risk of the software.
The inability to send “tagged” simulated data across interface was another 
significant safety issue. The clear representation of track types for all systems in 
the meta-system is paramount for the safety of the friendly forces or assets.
It is the recommendation of this research to redesign the AWS so that it would be 
able to “tag” training or test tracks and clearly represent the simulated tracks to 
other systems as simulated and totally distinguishable from real tactical tracks.
It is also the recommendation of this research for the receiving systems such as 
GMD to redesign its system to receive simulated, tagged data for test and training 
and be able to interpret these tracks as such. The redesign on both sides will 
prevent any operator confusion and the likelihood for an inadvertent launch of 
weapons.
4.4 RESULTS
The analysis of the interoperability issues in a specific complex system of 
systems- namely the U.S. Navy’s Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 3.0 program 
was performed using SSIF. We applied the core entities of the SSIF, mainly the 
SoS, SoSE, SoSSE and SCD, to see how we can decompose the SoS, from safety 
standpoint, to analyze the interoperability data and if we need to, identify the 
design features that make the SCD’s interactions safe. The analysis was scoped to 
“interface analysis” to evaluate the transmission and interoperation of the tasks by 
the systems in the combat system. The Safety Critical Data in Aegis BMD was 
analyzed according to the SSIF attribute. The analysis “framed” the 
interoperability issues affecting the total combat systems. In at least one case 
SSIF surpassed the viability of the current process used for Aegis BMD program. 
When issues discovered, they were documented in “Findings” section following 
the analysis of a particular combat system function mapped to SSIF attributes.
As the result of the above analysis, and as one of the significant “by-products” of 
this research, a system safety interoperability statement is produced. This 
observation represents the “essence” of system safety interoperability, i.e. if  we 
were to plug in the variables (such as transmission, reception, etc.), we would 
have safe interoperation. The statement is that:
The System Safety Interoperability is a function of: Safe Transmission, 
Reception, Interpretation, and Performance of Safety Critical Data.
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4.5. CHAPTER SUMMARY
The focus of this chapter was the application of SSIF to Aegis BMD 3.0 program 
for analysis of safety interoperability issues in the ABMD combat system. The 
Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 3.0 Program was used as a “use case” to explore 
the strengths of the framework, and to validate the utility of it for analysis of 
system safety interoperability issues.
First the ABMD SoS was defined and described. The safety critical subsystems 
and components and interfaces were identified based on the criteria of paragraph 
4.3.3. The top-level potential mishaps, and the subsystems from where the 
hazards originated were identified. Using this data, we were able to evaluate 
safety critical functions for the data transmission, receptions, and interpretation. 
We identified and evaluated all the safety critical data that will be transmitted for 
actions by other subsystems.
Additionally, the analysis of the interoperability issues concluded with an 
“emergence” of a system safety interoperability statement. The statement provides 
insight into the “essence” of safe interoperability concept and allows for more 
system thinking taking place in each “variable” area. This statement is further 
response to research question #1 stated in Chapter I.
The application of SSIF to Aegis BMD program and its effectiveness in analyzing 
the safety interoperability issues is in response of research question #2 stated in 
Chapter I.
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION / RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH
In Chapter I, we were introduced to the reality of our times, to our challenging 
new threats, and our needs to do more to overcome those challenges. We stated 
that much has been done to use our legacy systems and to synergy our capabilities 
for a greater good. We also stated, then, proved in literature review, that our 
performance criteria have left “system safety” behind, and that we should be 
thinking and saying “safe performance” instead of just “performance”. It is a 
cultural change that we cannot afford to ignore or to delay, for the lives of many 
can be saved by simply designing safe systems.
This “gap” in our engineering behavior was affirmed by being demonstrated in 
related literature review, shown in Chapter II.
5.1.1 Review of Research Questions
The purpose of the research was to develop a system safety interoperability 
framework that can be used to study and analyze the safety interoperability issues 
in the complex system of systems. In realizing this purpose, we posed two 
questions that the research had to answer. They were:
• What is system safety interoperability for a complex system of systems?
• How can safety interoperability be analyzed for a complex system of 
systems?
The first question was answered by:
1. Introducing the concept of system safety interoperability in Chapter I, 
paragraph 1.6- “safety interoperability”, and an example was provided to facilitate 
understanding of the concept. Then later in the chapter, the system safety 
interoperability was defined as,
“A capability encompassing many o f the safety issues relative to integration, 
compatibility and interface that are impinging upon the effectiveness with which 
independent, heterogeneous and/or homogeneous systems, components or 
elements, including human factor, may safely interact. ” (Alborzi, 2004).
2. In Chapter II, the safety interoperability was discussed in detail, and another 
example was provided, in paragraph 2.6.2, “Pre-Mature Launch”, involving the 
interaction between a missile system, a launcher system and weapon control 
system. As a part of discussion, the system safety issues were provided.
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3. In Chapter III, paragraph 3.2 we showed the link between system safety and 
interoperability and showed clearly that system safety is, in fact, a dimension of 
interoperability that must be integrated in overall interoperability design and 
testing for an effective and safe performance.
4. In Chapter IV, as the result of the application of SSIF and analysis, a system 
safety interoperability statement posited that stated that the System Safety 
Interoperability is a function of safe transmission, reception, interpretation, and 
performance of Safety Critical Data.
The second answer was answered by:
The Development of System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) (see 
Figure 3.4.b) by the following procedure:
1. Based on the available literature and lessons learned of some accidents, we 
developed and established a list of criteria to evaluate the safe interoperability 
capability of existing analysis approaches in Chapter II. We determined that any 
method to analyze the safe interoperability capability must meet the following 
criteria:
A: SoS-based
B: Address of Model Correlation
C: Knowledge /Safety Requirements of Remote Operations (interfaces)
D: Feedback (validation &verification) Capability
E: Translation Methodology (messages, representation of entities, etc.)
F: Safe Federation Extensibility Capability
SoS-based: We stated that the approach used for analysis must be based on
systems of systems context. Single-based approaches are unable to address the 
safety implications, nature and/or the requirements for interoperation between 
multiple complex systems that need to be logically and functionally integrated 
and interoperable.
Address of Model Correlation: It was further stated that the approach chosen for 
analysis must address modeling differences and resolutions/mitigations for 
differences. Developing a federation of autonomously developed heterogeneous 
systems involves many real-world entities and potentially many models of those 
entities by the many systems (Young, 2002). Manual correlation of different 
models of each real-world entity could be difficult, unsafe, and time-consuming 
effort. In integrating database systems, the data correlation problem poses one of 
the biggest safety issues. We mentioned real-world systems that have been having 
many problems with this issue of correlation anomalies, such as CEC, and it was 
determined that this criterion will be one of the essential ‘ingredient’ in resolution 
of interoperability from safety perspective. Object-Oriented method for
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Interoperability is an effective method that can assist the resolution problems, and 
that SSIF can be founded upon.
Knowledge / Requirements of Remote Operations (interfaces): We stated that 
an approach to analysis of safe interoperability capability must be able to address 
interface requirements. First is the knowledge or awareness of the existence or 
identity of those systems with which it communicates. These requirements 
include knowledge of interfacing systems’ functionalities, a mechanism by which 
each system in SoS can “talk” and “be understood” by other systems, receive 
data. This mechanism enables a system within a federation to invoke operations 
implemented on another systems. Safe-invoking operations is the criterion for 
analysis approaches. Safe-invoking approach of safety critical command of other 
systems in the federation is essential for the safe operation of the overall system 
of systems. Loss of safety critical interface falls in this criterion. For example, 
loss of uplink data to the Missile in Flight (MIF) is safety critical issue because 
Missile uses the uplink data to guide itself toward the target. Not having the 
uplink data as the result of interface loss leads to the MIF flying blindly, therefore 
causing a catastrophic accident.
Feedback (Validation & Verification) Capability: The next criterion was that 
any approach must address each system’s need and capability to give feedback to 
other systems in the federation, to validate the safety critical messages as for their 
format, their content, their size, their acceptable boundaries, etc., and verify that 
they can be used for operations. It must also address mechanism by which 
erroneous information is returned to sender without causing corruption or 
malfunction of the receiving system. Erroneous information include incomplete 
messages, formatting problem, or “not-understandable’ information. The feedback 
capability is more than a “hand-shake” capability; it verifies that a message can be 
processed (used) in the receiving system. The analysis approach must allow for 
managing interfaces by listing and documenting controls, dependencies, and data 
objects across the interfaces.
Translation Methodology: We noted the two different types of translators being 
used in engineering community. Early interoperability attempts involved the 
creation of custom point-to-point (also known as source-to-destination) interfaces 
between systems. This approach was to resolve representational differences 
between multiple complex systems, potentially requires n(n-l) translation for a 
federation of n systems.
The other type was to employ a platform-independent approach in determining 
the translations during a two-step conversion and that will require 2(n) 
translations. This method is not only more efficient, but it is more productive in 
terms of cost and memory consumptions. We mentioned that the safety integrity 
of safety critical data transmitted between systems increases with less translations,
i.e. with 2-step method.
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Safe Federation Extensibility Capability: We said that the SoS must be 
extendable, without reducing its safety quality. This capability refers both to 
computer languages used in the systems and to extensibility of the federation in 
terms of additions to the federation. We stated that:
a. A program is considered extensible if enhancements can be made to an existing 
component or data structure without adversely impacting the dependent entities. 
Dependent entities are those components that interact with original entity. A 
federation is safe-extensible when enhancements can be made to an existing 
component or data structure without compromising (or affecting) the designed-in 
safeguards in the dependent entities.
b. A federation is considered extensible when additional systems can be added to 
the federation and changes can be made to information and interfaces among 
systems without adversely affecting interoperation of the original system 
federation. A federation is safe-extensible when additional systems can be added 
to the federations and changes can be made to information and interface among 
systems without adversely affecting the designed-in safeguards in the 
interoperations of the original system federation.
This safe federation extensibility provides the foundation for federation reuse 
(new upgrades, etc.) without concerns regarding safety critical data being 
impacted.
2. After we established the criteria, we evaluated the two existing approaches 
(to analyzing the safety interoperability in complex Navy combat systems). We 
explained and clearly showed why the two approaches cannot meet the criteria 
and therefore cannot effectively analyze the safety issues in the interoperability of 
a large complex system.
3. Then in Chapter III, we introduced a new “method” for analyzing the SoS 
for safe interoperability issues. The new model-based approach was System safety 
interoperability framework (SSIF). The SSIF was discussed in depth in Chapter 
III. The core ‘elements’ or attributes that characterized the SSIF were:
• System of Systems (SoS)
• System of Systems Engineering (SoSE)
• System of Systems Safety Engineering (SoSSE)
• Safety Critical Data (SCD)
SoS- It was stated that when two or more independent, autonomous complex 
systems are integrated and interconnected as one larger system to perform a 
higher level of mission requirement, the result is a system of systems. These 
systems are interconnected and integrated and will be required to perform joint 
execution of tasks. In fact these systems are now one larger, more complex 
system, called a system of systems, a meta-system, a Federation (of systems), or
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in military terms, a combat system. SoS Engineering will accomplish the 
integration, interrelation, and interconnection of the systems in the combat 
system.
SoSE- The SoSE is an evolution (more than an extension) of traditional Systems 
Engineering (SE). We showed an example of three autonomous systems being 
required to integrated and interoperate as one larger, more complex system and 
that the “mechanism” by which this development, modification and 
reconfiguration or transformation can occur, is SoSE methodology.
SoSSE- We stated that another attribute of SSIF is SoSSE. This is the means by 
which a meta-system can be analyzed for safety through a SoS Safety Engineering 
(SoSSE) program. This program will focus on the safety issues involving the meta 
system. The hazards at the subsystem level have been resolved at the system level 
within the SSE. The hazards that exist and originate at any of the subsystems and 
can contribute to the overall risk of the meta system, that is, can contribute to a 
mishap at the meta system level will be identified, analyzed, and corrected via 
SoSSE which is an integrated element of SoSE (see Figure 3.4.a).
Moreover, we stated that the SoSSE methodology needs to be developed (left for 
future research) and listed the number of “characterization” that the methodology 
must posses for effective implementation of safety program.
SCD- Safety Critical Data is the next core SSIF characterization attribute. SCD is 
computed during run time by the SCFs interaction through the system of systems, 
and are analyzed as a part of the SoSSE. SCD exists in all safety critical 
applications and systems, such as missile systems, command and control systems, 
explosive systems, and nuclear systems.
Some of the ways to monitor the safety integrity of SCD is:
• Ensure that intended data is correctly accessed (keywords are intended and 
correctly.)
• Ensure that SCD is not corrupted
• Ensure the validity of data
• Checking for out of bound parameters
• There is no unused data
• Ensure that there is no memory conflicts
• Ensure error detection/ alerts reporting for SCD
• Safety critical interfaces are identified
• Ensure the integrity of tactical data and training data
• No self-modifying code, especially in safety critical functions
• No unused or dead code
• Ensure that Exceptions are processed correctly
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4. Then SSIF was evaluated against the same criteria that we had established 
in Chapter III, paragraph 3.5, and proved to meet it and therefore, a potential tool 
for effective analysis of safety interoperability issues in system of systems 
environment.
5. The SSIF was validated by three subject matter experts to have potential 
effectiveness for use in analysis of safety interoperability for complex system of 
systems. Appendix “B” shows the formal memos received from these experts and 
their short biography.
6. SSIF was then applied to analysis of Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense 3.0 
Program. We used the core characterization attributes of SSI in the Aegis BMD 
program and were able to identify the safety critical functions of the overall meta 
system and isolate the SCD that were going to be used for interoperations. The 
application of SSIF to ABMD is shown in Figure 4.3.g
As stated in Chapter IV, paragraph 4.3, and shown in Figure 4.3.b, the subsystems 
and components of subsystems were identified and analyzed for their safety 
criticality. Once the safety critical subsystems, interfaces and components were 
identified, the list of potential Top Level Mishaps (TLM) was developed. As a 
part of SCD application segment, the safety critical functions were identified and 
evaluated for the SCD that it will host in order to interoperate with other systems.
We noted the SCD error checking methods, and evaluated ABMD for this 
verification, and noted that ABMD used message type form of verification and 
validation during system operation.
System Safety Interoperability Statement
As a “by-product” of the above research analysis, we posited a system safety 
interoperability statement. The statement will enable scientist and engineers to 
discuss, apply to real-world issues, and to advance system thinking in systems 
safety engineering.
We stated that system safety interoperability is a function of:
• Safe Transmission, Reception, Interpretation, and Performance of Safety 
Critical Data.
5.1.2 Research Contributions / Significance
Contributions
The list of contributions that this research makes to the body of knowledge was 
noted in Chapter I, paragraph 1.7.2, and listed here (in three categories) for recap.
The analysis of system safety interoperability has made the following 
contributions to the “Practice” segment of Body of Knowledge:
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a. Identification and evaluation of the safety issues in external 
interfaces and external interactions provides a basis for focused 
and orchestrated safety analysis from total system perspective.
b. The analysis of the focused area in project management team will 
translate into allocating the right resources (both from expertise 
and funding perspective); this means doing the necessary work 
with optimum efficiency.
c. Identification of the safety attributes of the system that are affected 
by the integration into a tactical combat system. The safety 
attributes are those features, design constraints, etc. that define the 
safety in system context.
d. The “building blocks” created by this research and the analytical 
methods used will provide more insight into the safety 
interoperability issues than has the traditional methods.
e. The System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) can be used 
for mishaps risk reduction purposes.
f. Risk reduction noted in the paragraph “e” above will translate into 
saving lives of our war-fighters by reducing and eventually 
eliminating friendly fire accidents.
The contributions to the “Theory” segment of Body of Knowledge include:
b. Defining and documenting, the safety interoperability impediments in a 
tactical combat system environment. This will aid the future design engineers 
in designing safety during development of complex systems.
c. Posit a statement of system safety interoperability for complex combat 
systems.
d. The advancement of “System Thinking” by proving, through scientific 
analyses, that interoperability capability is not just a performance issue but 
also a safety issue that needs to be included in all systemic evaluations. The 
new “improved” systems thinking will enable us to identify processes that 
have potential in solving complex problems, will also enable us to have 
control over the “health” of the system.
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Significance
The significance of this analysis lies in its somewhat invisible yet crucial role in 
development of weapons systems and their use in tactical operations. Primarily, 
the following lists the significance of study:
a. Originality of Concept- Interoperability is not just a Performance issue, 
but also a safety issue. Although DoD have initiated the effort in 
understanding and implementing interoperability requirements in today’s 
Navy complex systems, the system safety dimension of it has never been 
studied or even acknowledged.
b. A new leap into system safety engineering. Up to this point, system safety 
engineering had a single-system-based approach. No provisions, tools or 
processes or standards exist for system of systems architecture. No 
scholarly analysis of system safety interoperability in systems of systems 
environment has ever been conducted.
c. Risk Reduction/Management- The analysis with this depth and breath will 
have significant impact on how engineers design safety into the systems, 
so safety can become the property of the meta-system. Safe systems have 
inherently low risk for mishaps. This will translate into lower number of 
friendly fires, inadvertent launch, or launch based on misinformation, 
miscommunication, etc.
d. System Safety being advanced in “systems thinking”. The advanced 
systems thinking will lead to development o f more comprehensive 
systems theories, application methods and finally in higher systems 
thinking.
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
5.2.1 Development of SoSE / SoSE Methodology
1. System of Systems Engineering discipline to be formally developed for the 
engineering of system of systems. Currently, in U.S. Navy, the traditional system 
engineering discipline is used, through ‘ad hoc’ modifications, as the need arises, 
to engineer, modify and reconfigure the complex systems.
2. To include Object Oriented Method for Interoperability (OOMI) as part of 
system of systems engineering methodology. This will enable the development 
team to resolve the modeling differences in heterogeneous system that are the 
source of impediments for the interoperation of systems.
3. To include Holistic Framework for Software Engineering (HFSE) as a part of 
system of systems engineering methodology. The HFSE enables the developers to
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keep a requirement-based holistic knowledge of efforts throughout the 
development phase and beyond. Also the HFSE assists in keeping the “relational” 
meaning of requirements throughout the development of software. This will 
especially be beneficial to both the software engineering team and the system 
safety engineering team.
4. It is recommended that any future studies of interoperability to include “ How 
to measure the effectiveness of interoperability.” This is different than “How to 
achieve interoperability” in that by setting criteria for interoperability and meeting 
them, it does not mean we achieved interoperability in the level of effectiveness 
that we require.
5.2.2 Development of SoSSE / SoSSE Methodology
1. It is recommended that System of Systems Safety Engineering to be formally 
defined and developed for complex safety critical applications. This development 
must be based on system safety principles and precepts that were mentioned in 
this research.
2. New analysis tools must be developed to respond to the new system problems 
in SoS. The current analysis tools that system safety uses (see Chapter II, 
paragraph 2.3.7) such as FTA or FMECA are inadequate to effectively address the 
safety issues in system of systems environment. The development of these new 
tools must be software-based and software-focused to effectively identify the 
safety issues in interoperations and propose solutions for resolution of conflicts.
3. Although the purpose and the objective of this risk did not include risk 
assessment, based on the review of current literature (see entire Chapter II), it is 
recommended that future research efforts be focused on the development of 
criteria for risk assessment beyond what is provided now. Currently, the risk 
assessment is based on two categories- probability and severity. It is the 
recommendation of this research to evaluate the possibility of the third category, 
such as the “control of software” over the operation of the total system. The re­
assessment of current risk assessment method in the software-extensive and 
critical applications, in the more complex system of systems of today, is a must, 
and doing anything less will be an absolute disservice to our war-fighters.
4. Development of standards and formal guidance documents are another area to 
where future researches can be directed. The latest “D” version of MIL-STD-882 
is “acquisition-reform friendly” instead of “SoS safety friendly”. Standards that 
establish clear and thoughtful system safety principles and precepts, and are the 
guiding lights of SoS safety engineers who work in an fluid but adaptive 
development environment can make a great contribution in eliminating or 
reducing safety risks.
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5. To study the potential applicability of SSIF to non-military complex systems 
with interoperability requirements.
5.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS
As evidenced in Chapter III and IV, and the summary above, the objectives of this 
research have been achieved by answering the two research questions listed in 
paragraph 1.4.1, and then again above, paragraph 5.1.1. The answering of the 
research questions was made possible by the research purpose—i.e., by the 
development and application of a model-based framework to analyze the safety 
interoperability of complex U.S. Navy combat systems. System safety 
Interoperability Framework (SSIF) was developed and applied to Aegis BMD 3.0 
Program for analysis of safety interoperability issues.
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ABMD Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense
ACTS Aegis Combat Training System
AWS Aegis Weapon System
BIT Built in Test
BLK Block
BMD Ballistic Missile Defense
BMDS Ballistic Missile Defense System
C&D Command and Decision
CS PFS Combat System Principal for Safety
CSSWG Combat System Safety Working Group
c s u Control System Upgrade
DTRM Dual Thrust Rocket Motor
EMI Electromagnetic Interference
ET&E Engineering Test and Evaluation
ETBA Energy Trace and Barrier Analysis
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
FTS Flight Termination System
GMD Ground-based Midcourse Defense
GPS Global Positioning System
HERO Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Ordnance
HERP Hazards of Electromagnetic Radiation to Personnel
IDO Initial Defense Operations
IPT Integrated Product Team
IR Infrared
KW Kinetic Warhead
LCS Launch Control System
LCCP Launcher Computer Control Program
LDO Limited Defensive Operation
LEAP Lightweight Exothermic Atmospheric Projectile
LOT Launch On TADIL-J
LRS&T Long Range Surveillance and Track
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LSEQ Launcher Sequencer
MDA Missile Defense Agency
MDS Missile Downlink System
MEIT Multi-Element Integration Testing
MP Mission Planner
MSL Missile
NSPD National Security Presidential Directive
NSWCDD Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division
NTW Navy Theater-Wide
ORTS Operational Readiness Test System
PFS Principal for Safety
RADHAZ Radiation Hazards
RF Radio Frequency
SCD Safety Critical Data
SCF Safety Critical Function
SCI Safety Critical Interface
SCM Safety Critical Message
SCUS System Calibration Using Satellites
SDACS Solid Divert Attitude Control System
SE System Engineering
SM STANDARD Missile
SoS System of Systems
SoSE System of Systems Engineering
SoSSE System of Systems Safety Engineering
SSIF System Safety Interoperability Framework
SSMP System Safety Management Plan
SSP System Safety Program
SSPP System Safety Program Plan
SSSTRP Software System Safety Technical Review Panel
TADIL Tactical Digital Information Links
TBMD Theater Ballistic Missile Defense
TDDS Tactical Data Distribution System
TDP Technical Data Package
TH Tomahawk
TLM Top Level Mishap
TSRM Third-Stage Rocket Motor
VGI VLS GPS Integrator
VLA Vertical Launching ASROC





Vertical Launching System 
Weapon Control System
Weapon System Explosives Safety Review Board
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me program office.
The request to use the AEGIS BMD as a use case also includes the publication o! my dissertation in May
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Appendix B 
INITIAL VALIDATION OF SSIF
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B.O INTRODUCTION
The System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) was validated initially 
(before being applied to Aegis BMD system), by three subject-matter experts 
(SMEs). Decision-making relative to choosing a design or an approach, by using 
subject matter experts is not new, however using a structured mechanism for their 
elicitation did not emerged until WWII (Chytka, 2003). Increased technological 
innovations and advances in system-based methodologies and thinking along with 
shortage of experts in the areas of complex systems have renewed the interest in 
using expert judgment in evaluation of conceptual artifacts.
Expert judgment is merely an opinion based on years o f experience, education, 
research, and lessons-leamed. It can be viewed as a snapshot (Chytka, 2003) of 
the expert’s state of mind and knowledge at the time of response to an inquiry.
The definition of expert and expert performance is prerequisite for the assessment 
that will follow. If there were standards against which to evaluate the expert’s 
judgment, then the accuracy of the expert’s judgment will be easy to determine. 
However, standards rarely exist in the areas of complexity and highly technical 
problems, which is why only few experts exist in those areas.
Many researchers have tried to correlate experience with expertise. Although, in 
most cases this may be true, that is, a person with many years of experience in a 
particular job, would possess an expertise on that area, there is no scientific or 
statistical evidence to support that correlation.
Some have associated accreditation with expertise. For example if someone has 
been ‘board certified” (Chytka, 2003) or engineers who have passed the 
“professional Engineer” exam, may be regarded as experts. The issue associated 
with this thinking is that the certification is a one-time exam, and the performance 
of the person may decline but he/she could still possess the certification or 
accreditation.
Peer identification method is that when few experts who are known and 
considered to be experts are chosen or regarded as experts. Chytka (Chytka, 2003) 
is concerned that this may be the result of “popularity effect”, and that those who 
may have more insight into the technical problem but are not “popular” or known, 
may be disregarded as experts.
Chytka (Chytka, 2003) proposes the aggregation of expert opinion in the area of 
conceptual design (such as SSIF). Her research determines that using three 
experts can bear useful fruits, and any more will be counter-productive for it leads 
to less confidence in the final estimate. We will use a modified approach based on 
Chytka’s research.
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Approach
Due to the fact that the SSIF is a conceptual framework, thus the confirmation of 
its viability and effectives infeasible before its application to Aegis BMD 
program, and the fact that the design of a methodology based on this framework is 
going to be in the distant future, this “validation” of the experts becomes 
somewhat subjective. The expert elicitation methodology used in this research is 
guided by the research of Chytka (Chytka, 2003). The validation of SSIF by the 
experts uses notions used in Pederson et al. (Chytka, 2003) referenced by Chytka. 
All of these guidelines have been somewhat modified in this research to meet the 
applicability of this domain.
For more information of the entire discussion of SMEs and methodologies used, 
the readers can obtain the cited reference.
Due to specialized nature of this research, a sample of 30 was determined to be 
sufficient from which the final three subject matter experts can be chosen. This 
list was chosen from nationally known System Safety Society contact list. This 
society is located in Unionville, Virginia. Paragraph B.2.1 shows the general 
criteria used for this sample.
B .l DEFINITIONS
The following definitions apply within this appendix:
Experience: The years worked or evaluated work. The evaluation assumes that 
the work is reviewed thoroughly and is evaluated for sound and quality safety 
program.
Point: value points given to assist in weighting qualifications in order to perform 
assessment.
BA/BS: Bachelor of Arts/Bachelor of Science includes a 4-year science and 
engineering degree.
Ms/ME: Masters of Science/ Masters of Engineering includes a master degree in 
science or engineering. If a person had two masters’ degrees, it’ll be given double 
points.
PhD: Doctor of Philosophy in science or engineering.
B.2 PROCESS
The process to identify subject matter experts included:
1. Development of Expertise criteria
2. Identify a small sample (max 30) of candidates
3. Weight each candidate against the general criteria (see Table A-l)
4. Choose the top 5 candidates
5. Weight each candidate against the “specialized” criteria
6. Choose the final three experts
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B.2.1 GENERAL CRITERIA
The following, lists the general criteria that the author used in evaluating 30 
candidates and selecting the top five candidates.
• Professional Experience
• System safety Experience
• Education
The general criteria were developed by brainstorming in discussion between the 
author, the advisors, and broader subject of the dissertation.
Table A-l- General Criteria
GENERAL
CRITERIA W e ig h t  P o i n t s
0-5 yrs 6-10 yrs 11-15 yrs 16-20 yrs 21+ yrs
Professional
Experience
1 2 3 4 5
System safety 
Experience
1 2 3 4 5
Education BA/BS: 1 MS/ME: 2 PhD: 3
A sample worksheet from is shown in Table A-2.
Table A-2- Evaluation against General Criteria











30: 5 30: 5 BS: 1 11
P. Rogers 15: 3 15: 3 BS: 1 7
M.
Zemore
20:4 18:4 ME: 2 10
D. Bower 21: 5 12: 3 ME: 2 10
K. Stottlar 21: 5 20: 5 BS: 1 11
A. Lim 7: 2 7:2 2 ME: 4 8
B. Cobb 18:4 8:4 ME: 2 10
P.Eagon 10:2 10:2 BS: 1 5
B.2.2 SPECIALIZED CRITERIA
The following criteria constitute the specialized areas that the author used to 
evaluate the top 5 candidates for selection of the top three experts. These areas of 
expertise were selected based on the subject covered in the dissertation.
• Weapon System Experience
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• BMD Experience
• Missile System Experience
• Command &Control (C2) System Experience
• Launching Systems Experience
Table A-3- Specialized Criteria
Specific Criteria Yes: 1 Yes: 1 Yes: 1 Yes: 1 Yes: 1
(Specialized No: 0 No: 0 No: 0 No: 0 No: 0
Expertise)
B.2.3 EVALUATION
The five candidates with highest score from Table A-2 were evaluated against the 
“specialized” areas. The following table displays the evaluation worksheet that 
determined the final three subject experts.









G. Friedman 1 1 1 1 4
D. Bower 1 1 1 1 4
M. Zemore 0 1 0 1 2
B. Cobb 0 1 0 0 1
K. Stottlar 1 1 1 0 3
Per Table A-4 above, Gary Friedman, Doug Bower and Kevin Stottlar were 
chosen to review and validate the SSIF for its soundness and effectiveness in 
evaluating safe interoperability issues in Aegis BMD 3.0 program.
B.2.4 SSIF Validation Criteria
The three subject matter experts developed their own criteria to evaluate SSIF. 
The combined criteria (without repetition) is as follows:
• Applicability to SoS Operational environment
• Capture of Interoperation capability
• Lessons-Leamed (from Gulf war, Iraq War, and near-miss accidents)
• Professional Experience
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B.3 VALIDATION RESULTS
The subject-matter experts reviewed and evaluated the SSIF against the above 
criteria and all approved it for use for Aegis BMD analysis of safety 
interoperability issues. The complete transcript of approval and the qualification 
of the experts are noted in the following paragraphs.
B.3.1 Approval
From: Stottlar, Kevin G CIV NSWCDL-G71-Branch
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 4:58 PM
To: Alborzi, Showkat S CIV NSWCDL-G71 -Branch
Subject: RE: SSIF for your review
Showkat
I have read your System Safety Interoperability Framework and like your approach. I 
believe you have captured the essence of what challenges are faced in the systems 
engineering community in developing and assessing a System of Systems particularly 
the system safety perspective. Well done.
From: Friedman, Gary H CIV NSWCDL-G71-Branch
Sent: Tuesday, January 18, 2005 5:51 PM
To: Alborzi, Showkat S CIV NSWCDL-G71-Branch
Subject: RE: SSIF Validation by Subject Experts
Showkat,
I have reviewed your SSIF diagram and found it acceptable for supporting your proposed 




Aegis BMD Combat System Principal For Safety 
Naval Surface Warfare Center Dahlgren Division 
Code G71
17320 Dahlgren Road 
Dahlgren, Virginia 22448-5100 
(540) 653-7803 (voice) DSN 249-7803 
(540) 845-0036 (cell)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
From: Bower, Douglas J CIV NSWCDL-G71-Branch
Sent: Friday, January 21, 2005 2:41 PM
To: Alborzi, Showkat S CIV NSWCDL-G71 -Branch
Subject: System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF)
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Showkat,
I have reviewed the System Safety Interoperability Framework (SSIF) and concur with its 
application to the proposed system.
.V-w/aA | . famm*
l/U'pjuj. - ij.i: /'/: Glw/vmm 
Tlwjol 1'AÛojjb umk% ' Bijmmjmi - 1)7̂
StU\ 5‘J0-fo5,5-8t?.33 Ml: 540-^55-8^53 TUk: 29
B.3.2 Biography
A short biography of each of the three subject-matter experts is provided below.
o Kevin Stottlar is currently working for the U.S. Navy as the 
Aegis Combat System Principal for Safety (PFS). He has 
oversight responsibility over Lockheed Martin and other 
support contractors to ensure the safety of the systems used 
in Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers. He has 22 years of System 
Safety experience, and has served as Principal for Safety for 
Vertical Launching System (VLS) and Cooperative 
Engagement Capability (CEC). He has B.S. in Computer 
Science.
o Gary Friedman is currently working as AEGIS Ballistic 
Missile Defense System Combat System safety Principal for 
Safety (PFS) for the U.S. Navy. He has oversight 
responsibility over VLS, AEGIS and SM-3 system safety 
programs. He is also the PFS for SM-2 and SM-6 programs. 
He has 25 years of system safety experience. He holds a 
Mechanical Engineering degree.
o Mr. Bower is a Lead Computer Scientist with the United 
States Navy, working at the Naval Surface Warfare Center 
Dahlgren Division in Dahlgren, Virginia and has been 
serving as Chairman of the Software Systems Safety 
Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP), since March 2001. He 
has over 19 years of combined experience in system safety 
engineering and software engineering. Mr. Bower has 
specialized expertise in software system safety engineering 
and missile system safety. He has a MS in Computer 
Science from Virginia Tech. He also has severed for over 21 
years as a Field Artillery officer in the Virginia Army 
National Guard and is currently a Major serving as the Equal 
Opportunity Officer for the Engineer Brigade 28th ID (M).
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B .4  S U M M A R Y
The initial validation of SSIF was performed using structured process to identify 
the first pool of candidates from the nationally known system safety society. 
Then, a general criteria and specialized criteria were developed by brainstorming 
between the author and advisors and dissertation subject matters. First 30 people 
were evaluated against the general criteria. Then the highest five scores were 
evaluated against the specific (specialized) expertise areas, and three experts were 
identified. SSIF was evaluated against the expert’s criteria and found to be a 
sound framework to analyze safety interoperability issues in Aegis BMD 
program.
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VITA
The author of this dissertation, Showkat Shanaz Alborzi, is currently employed by the 
Department of the Navy at Naval Surface Warfare Center in Dahlgren, Virginia. She is 
the lead system safety engineer for the Aegis Combat System and Aegis Ballistic Missile 
Defense Combat System Safety programs. She is also working on Japanese Cooperative 
Research program. Showkat is also serving as a panel member on the Software System 
Safety Technical Review Panel (SSSTRP)-the board that evaluates the software safety 
program of the Navy’s war-fighting systems. Her professional career includes 
development, testing, and maintenance of Aegis Weapon System software. She regards 
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